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INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, widespread dissatisfaction with the patent system—and
particularly with the perceived poor quality of issued patents—has spurred a
broad range of groups to call for reform. Congress is currently looking into the
possibility of significant reform.1 One important reform proposal upon which
otherwise divergent groups broadly agree is fortification of administrative
procedures, particularly through the institution within the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) of a trial-type system of post-grant opposition.2
The emphasis on fortifying administrative procedures through new legislation
is in accord with the Supreme Court’s interest, demonstrated through its 1999
Dickinson v. Zurko decision,3 in applying administrative law to the patent
system. Indeed, the inattention to administrative law principles has long been a
striking feature of the patent system. In contrast to commentators and practitio-
ners in other technically complex areas (for example, environmental law, telecom-
munications law, and food and drug law), the patent law community has tended
to pay little attention to administrative law.4 In part, this has been because, until
1. See generally Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of
2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
2. Three entities that have endorsed post-grant review are the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the American Intellectual Property Law Association. See
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW
AND POLICY ch. 5, at 23–24 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]; STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., NAT’L ACAD.
OF SCIS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004) [hereinafter NAS PROPOSAL]; AM. INTELLEC-
TUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT ENTITLED “A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY” 2 (2004), http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Issues_and_Ad-
vocacy/Comments2/Patent_and_Trademark_Office/2004/NAS092304.pdf. That three entities with such
different constituencies and roles would agree on the need for post-grant review is striking.
3. See 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (concluding that Administrative Procedure Act standards for
reviewing administrative findings of fact apply to findings made by the PTO).
4. Exceptions include one of the current authors in some of her prior work. See Arti K. Rai,
Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 199, 221–26 (2000) [hereinafter Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush]; Arti K. Rai, Engaging
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035,
1052–56 (2003) [hereinafter Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy]; see also John F. Duffy, On Improving
the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109,
125–35 (2000); Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415,
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1999, the primary expositor of patent law and policy, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (which hears all appeals in patent cases),5 denied that the
Administrative Procedure Act even applied to its review of the PTO.6 Addition-
ally, unlike such prominent agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Federal Communications Commission, the PTO does not have any
significant authority to issue substantive rules, and it does not typically render
legal interpretations of the patent statute to which courts must give Chevron
deference.7
Although administrative law thinking is now beginning to permeate the
patent community, incorporation of such thinking is far from complete.8 Some
judges on the Federal Circuit have been resistant to the Supreme Court’s
command in Zurko. Perhaps the most striking example of the failure to consider
administrative law is the prevailing position that post-grant opposition proceed-
ings should be governed by rules of judicial review borrowed from civil
procedure.9 Indeed, of the major reform proposals, only the FTC’s analysis
takes administrative law seriously.10 This is unfortunate, because an approach to
post-grant opposition grounded in rules of civil procedure will suffer from the
same collective action and public good problems that arise in trial court patent
challenges and is therefore unlikely to achieve significant efficiency benefits.11
1430–39 (1995). None of these prior articles, however, offers a theory of how administrative law should
apply to the patent system in light of current proposals for reform. For a discussion that begins to offer
such a theory, see Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power Over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 907 (2004).
5. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established in 1982 to hear all appeals in patent
cases. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, About the Court, http://www.fedcir.gov/about.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2006).
6. The significance of 1999 is that the Supreme Court decided Zurko that year. In this decision, the
Court explicitly rejected the “pre-APA standard of review.” Zurko, 527 U.S. at 155.
7. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226–30 (2001) (indicating that deference to legal interpretations under Chevron is most
often merited when an agency acts pursuant to a congressional grant of substantive rulemaking
authority or pursuant to a congressional grant of authority to conduct formal adjudications); infra notes
150–53 and accompanying text.
8. In some respects, the administrative law gap in patent law has parallels in antitrust law. In that
field, although Congress has given the FTC power to use both formal adjudication and substantive
rulemaking to render legal interpretations under the FTC Act, courts have sometimes been resistant to
invoke Chevron deference. See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this
Class?” The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 656 (2005)
(noting that “[c]ourts have only occasionally engaged in Chevron deference in the antitrust context”).
Some of the formal and functional problems raised by the failure to take administrative law seriously in
the case of the FTC Act are addressed by Farber and McDonnell, supra, at 644–57 (“Antitrust raises
tough, technical problems which require a sophisticated understanding of economics and business
practices in order [for decisionmakers] to be able to make sound policy . . . . Agencies are much more
likely to possess the required expertise than courts.”).
9. See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text (discussing use of estoppel-type provisions in
most reform proposals).
10. As we discuss further below, the FTC REPORT, supra note 2, argues that the results of post-grant
review by the PTO should be given Chevron deference by the Federal Circuit. See infra note 297 and
accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 267–87 and accompanying text.
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In this Article, we go beyond the preliminary discussions contained in cases
like Zurko and in the FTC report to provide a comprehensive account of the
intersection of patent law and administrative law.12 Such an account could
proceed from first principles—for example, designing an ideal agency and ideal
agency procedures from scratch, and then creating the desired judicial review
by generalist appellate courts.13 There is considerable value in accounts that
design ideal institutions. But for better or worse, a new start from the ground
up—whether in patent law or administrative procedure—is exceedingly un-
likely. By contrast, an approach that assumed no changes whatsoever to the
status quo might miss opportunities for improvement. In this Article, we adopt
an intermediate position, looking at what theory and doctrine would suggest for
the relationship between the judiciary and the PTO, and the ways in which
realistic changes to the existing process might be attractive in light of that
theory and doctrine. The result is a second-best solution—but one that is
considerably more desirable than the status quo.
For the most part, judicial review based on ordinary administrative law
doctrine, coupled with modest changes to existing PTO procedures, provides a
result that is both politically possible and normatively desirable. Fortified
administrative procedures could include not only post-grant opposition proceed-
ings available throughout the life of the patent but also the possibility of
self-selection into a more rigorous patent examination. Judicial review of these
proceedings based largely on standard administrative law principles would
create incentives for patents that are likely to be commercially significant to be
channeled into the proceedings and would thus provide reasonably accurate,
cost-effective determinations of patent validity. Additionally, proper application
of administrative law principles would provide an institutional foundation for
12. Such an account necessarily focuses on patent validity rather than issues (such as defenses to
infringement, nuances of patent claim construction, and remedies) that are more specific to the
enforcement of patents by trial courts in particular cases.
13. Cf. Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle 5–6 (Case
W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 06-17, George Washington Univ. Law Sch.,
Research Paper No. 225, Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id928498 (proposing a system under which multiple appellate courts would be responsible for
reviewing patent cases). Under such an ideal system, a specialized trial court might also be desirable.
See Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877
(2002). There has been some receptivity in Congress toward enhancing expertise at the trial level. See
H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2006) (bill introduced by Representative Issa “[t]o establish a pilot program in
certain United States district courts to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among
district judges”). Notably, the patent systems of most European countries, including the U.K. and
Germany, as well as Asian countries like Japan, have specialization at the trial level. See James F.
Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the Trial Bench, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 425, 427–28. Another possible approach to an ideal system might involve bolstering the PTO’s
economic expertise and giving it broad substantive rulemaking authority. Under such an approach, the
PTO would receive Chevron deference for legal interpretations made during rulemaking. See supra
note 7. However, given the tendency of rulemaking to be particularly subject to interest group
pressures, see infra note 234 and accompanying text, the attractiveness of substantive rulemaking
authority is unclear.
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the determinations of economic policy that the patent system should be making,
including economic policy determinations regarding how patent principles should
apply with respect to different types of technological information.14 In circum-
stances where rigorous administrative proceedings are in place, the result would
be significantly greater deference than the Federal Circuit currently gives.
One might endorse an administrative approach in theory but wonder whether
changes in standards of review actually produce observable differences in
judicial behavior. In the area of administrative law, the available empirical
evidence suggests that such changes can make a difference. Moreover, our own
empirical analysis of ten years of cases decided by the Federal Circuit before
and after the Supreme Court decision in Dickinson v. Zurko indicates that the
case law has had an impact on judicial behavior.15
Incorporation of administrative law principles into patent law has a larger
significance as well. In some situations, it may be tempting for judges and
practitioners to announce that a particular area of law is sui generis, such that
ordinary rules do not apply to it. Treating a particular area of law as an
14. Note this is a more fine-grained position than the assertion that patents play different roles in
different industries. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1577–78 (2003) (“[T]here is no reason to assume that a unitary patent system will optimally
encourage innovation in the wide range of diverse industries that it is expected to cover.”); Wesley M.
Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufactur-
ing Firms Patent (or Not) 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
Although one can make generalizations about industries, such generalizations are necessarily “rule-like”—
that is, they are likely to be over-inclusive and under-inclusive. For example, Burk and Lemley, who
tend to argue in favor of industry-specific policy, note that, even within industries, information can play
different roles. See Burk & Lemley, supra, at 1624–26 (observing that, within the biotechnology
industry, patents on DNA sequence information that can be used as a therapy operate very differently
from patents on other types of DNA sequence information). At the same time, such generalizations do
not necessarily have the easy applicability of rules. See id. at 1635 (noting that “boundaries between
industries are vague and notoriously mutable”). For these reasons, at least in the context of validity
determinations, we would generally prefer policy approaches that apply at the level of invention rather
than industry. Cf. id. at 1641 (distinguishing “macro”-level policy levers, which operate at an industry
level, from “micro”-level policy levers, which operate at the level of invention). Notably, many of the
validity standards in the patent statute, such as the requirement that the applicant has made an advance
that would be “nonobvious” to the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” seek to advance economic
goals by operating—at least when implemented appropriately—primarily at the level of invention. See
id. at 1648–49 (explaining that the “nonobviousness criterion” was originally understood as a “require-
ment that the claimed invention . . . not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made”). Indeed, one of the problems with much of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence,
particularly in the biopharmaceutical arena, is that it has tended to paint with a broad brush—assuming,
for example, that all invention in the biopharmaceutical area is inherently uncertain and therefore
nonobvious. The better-reasoned cases, by contrast, look at the particular invention at issue. See, e.g.,
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding a broad claim
on the grounds that cell manipulation techniques are understood).
From an economic policy standpoint, one particularly useful distinction at the level of invention
would be the distinction between infrastructural invention and more downstream activities. See Brett
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917,
929 (2005). For a discussion of how this distinction could be taken into account from a policy
standpoint, see infra notes 194–206 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text.
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exception to a broader regime allows judges and practitioners to take into
account specific features of that area in fashioning rules. For example, patents
may be different from some other regulatory regimes to the extent that the
patent system predates the New Deal era during which the administrative state
fully came into existence.16 Or one might argue that patents are different
because Congress chose to create a specialized appellate court to address
patents. But sui generis approaches are notorious for opening the door to undue
influence by groups whose interests focus on that area of law. Moreover,
isolating patents from mainstream administrative law ignores the many common-
alities between the PTO and other agencies. Patents are special, as are telecom-
munications, wetlands development, agriculture, and virtually every other
regulated activity. But their regulation at the federal level entails similarities
across agencies. Courts and practitioners that ignore those similarities may
achieve private gain (in the form of benefits that flow from their specialized
knowledge and access), but the costs and foregone benefits for the public can be
considerable.
Part I introduces the goals of patent law and the manner in which determina-
tions of patentability by the PTO seek to implement those goals. Part II
considers how existing administrative law doctrine (that is, administrative law
principles applied to other agencies) would apply to judicial review of PTO
patent decisions. As this Part discusses, the Federal Circuit has resisted the
application of ordinary administrative law doctrine to its review of the PTO.
Part III turns to normative considerations, addressing what form of judicial (and
particularly Federal Circuit) review of PTO patent decisions would be attrac-
tive. The choice between the PTO and the Federal Circuit is a comparative one,
and we consider the strengths and weaknesses of each. Part IV addresses the
degree to which application of existing administrative law doctrine would
advance those normative considerations. It argues that, in the main, such
application would in fact be normatively desirable, not only for existing PTO
procedures but also for proposed new ones. Moreover, the empirical evidence
suggests that changes in review standards could have some impact on Federal
Circuit behavior.
I. USING VALIDITY TO IMPLEMENT THE GOALS OF PATENT LAW
In this Section, we present a brief summary of the major normative goals of
patent law. We then discuss the manner in which the inquiry into patent validity
fosters these goals.
A. THE GOALS OF PATENT LAW
On the conventional account, the major normative goal of patent law is
16. See John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and
the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1124–39 (2000) (discussing the early history
of patent law).
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fostering innovation—both initial invention and the commercialization of such
invention. Although the importance of invention relative to commercialization
continues to be hotly debated,17 most patent scholars would agree that patents
can, and should, be used in some measure to promote both invention and
commercialization.18 In recent years, scholars have also contended that patents
play roles not directly connected with appropriation of profits from innovation.
For example, they assist small firms in attracting venture capital by providing a
signal that a firm has knowledge capital or is well-managed.19 And they are
used to form patent portfolios that are in turn used for a variety of different
17. Generally speaking, those scholars who view patents as a species of property right emphasize the
ways in which early and certain patent grants can promote efficient commercialization. See F. Scott
Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697
(2001); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275–77
(1977) (presenting the commercial benefits of the patent system compared to the less attractive system
of trade secrecy). Kitch’s position, which analogizes early stage patent claims to mining claims in the
American West, is sometimes called “prospect theory.” Cf. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect
Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 443–44 (2004) (asserting a defense of prospect theory that
focuses not on patents as property rights but on the ways in which prospect theory may channel
rent-dissipating patent races in the direction of patents that are granted early and hence expire early).
Scholars who view patent rights as distinct, at least in part, from ordinary property emphasize that the
information contained in inventions is a nonexclusive and nonrivalrous public good. See Mark Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1035 & n.8 (2005) (collecting
articles by scholars who regard patent rights as different from ordinary property). These scholars
contend that patents should generally be granted only to the extent necessary to generate the good;
allowing additional patenting beyond this level is likely to increase deadweight loss, hinder further use
and improvement, and promote rent-dissipating patent races. See id. at 1058–65.
At a high level of abstraction, debates regarding whether patents are or are not like property may be
intractable, partly because of the well-known malleability of terms like property (and for that matter,
the public domain and the commons). See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 67–68 (2003) (discussing a “Legal
Realism for the Public Domain” based on the reality that property has a similar messy history); Michael
A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2004)
(discussing the many ways in which property law “is not as absolute as it is often claimed”); Carol M.
Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1998) (noting that
“Blackstone himself was thoroughly aware of . . . pervasive and serious qualifications on exclusive
dominion”). Another reason is because patents play different roles with respect to different types of
information. See infra notes 18–26 and accompanying text.
18. Ashish Arora and Robert Merges have argued that patents promote technology markets. See
Ashish Arora & Robert Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights, and Firm Boundaries, 13
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004). We view this argument as related to the appropriation of innovation
rents story. Indeed, on this argument, patents are particularly valuable precisely because they allow
innovation rents to be appropriated in markets rather than solely in vertically integrated firms. Whether
the boundaries of patentable subject matter (and other patent law doctrines) have improperly been
extended to include not only inventive technology but also inventive ideas with poorly defined
boundaries is a question we do not take up here. For an interesting discussion, see Oren Bar-Gill &
Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (2005) (noting that
“patent law is gradually extending its reach to cover . . . even naked ideas”).
19. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 653 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiv-
ing Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 141–43 (2000)
(describing a “strong positive relationship between venture capital financing and patenting”).
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purposes—defensive and offensive.20 Assuming these accounts’ descriptive
accuracy,21 we do not believe that they offer independent normative goals for
patent law. Indeed, those who have discussed patent portfolios generally do not
see the rise of such portfolios as a normatively attractive development.22 But
some commentators who argue in favor of an independent signaling function for
patents appear to be more sanguine.23 To the extent that these commentators are
arguing for altered validity standards, we disagree. As an initial matter, patents
are likely to be accurate signals of knowledge capital and good management
only if they cover technologies that are either inventive or need patent protec-
tion for development.24 Moreover, even if certain information outside these
contexts occasionally demonstrates knowledge capital, any benefit that might
accrue from altering patentability standards to allow patents on such informa-
tion is outweighed by the costs that such patents would impose. In this Article,
therefore, we focus on the goals of invention and commercialization.
B. THE INQUIRY INTO PATENT VALIDITY
As various commentators have noted, achieving the goals of patent law
directly would, at least as a routine matter, probably be impractical.25 Absent
significant expenditure of resources—and perhaps even with such resource
expenditure—it would be difficult for the PTO (or the courts, for that matter) to
get traction on the question of whether a particular patent was necessary to
promote innovation (whether invention or development/commercialization) with
respect to a particular quantum of information.26
Indeed, the patent statute does not provide for such a direct inquiry. Instead of
asking whether a given patent is necessary to promote innovation, the patent
20. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical
Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 108–09
(2001); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2005).
21. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 20, at nn.66–82 (noting that given the low quality of
patents, individual patents are not likely to be good signals, and patent counts are likely to represent
strategic thinking about the patent system rather than knowledge capital); Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy, supra note 4, at 1082–83 (arguing that the low quality of patents produced by the PTO creates
very noisy signals for venture capitalists). But see Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in
the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 992 (2005) (arguing that software patents may provide
information about the firm).
22. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 20, at 76 (noting that “the net effect of patent
portfolios is likely to be negative” and suggesting a number of reform measures to reduce patent
portfolios’ prevalence); cf. Mann, supra note 21 (noting that the creation of patent portfolios for
purposes of cross-licensing is not likely to provide net benefits but that such portfolios may provide
some information about the firm).
23. See generally Long, supra note 19, at 625–28.
24. See supra note 21.
25. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 11 (observing that the “more manageable standards
of the patent statute” help to address the less administrable policy questions).
26. In any given case, it is easy to imagine economic experts having good faith disagreements on
whether an invention would have arisen without the expectation of a patent. Alternatively, they might
disagree on whether a patent is necessary to promote development and commercialization.
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statute directs the PTO to determine whether the patent application meets
validity standards that have scientific and technical underpinnings.27 Specifi-
cally, when the PTO examines a patent application in order to determine
whether to grant it, the PTO first construes the patent claims to determine
exactly how much inventive territory the applicant is claiming.28 Having deter-
mined the scope of the territory, the PTO then looks to whether the claims are
valid. Most importantly, under the patent statute, the PTO must determine “if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
[invention in the field] are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art.”29 The intuition behind this inquiry is that if the invention would
have been technically obvious to a person having ordinary skill, it would have
arisen without the patent incentive. Moreover, allowing patents on technically
obvious inventions could cause races to patent such inventions, diverting re-
sources away from more productive lines of inquiry.30 In contrast, a nonobvious
invention might not have arisen but for the patent incentive. Notably, the
inquiry into technical nonobviousness takes into account the possibility that a
particular invention may be “obvious to try” but nonetheless have only a limited
possibility of success. Under boilerplate patent law, inventions are obvious only
if the ordinary artisan attempting to make the invention would have a reason-
able expectation of success.31 Thus, inventions that are risky to make are
considered nonobvious.32
As compared with the ultimate economic question of whether a patent is
necessary to promote innovation, this intermediate scientific and technical
question may have an answer that is more determinate.33 To be sure, findings
about how skilled the “ordinary” artisan is, and about what constitutes the
relevant prior invention (known as “prior art”) of which this ordinary artisan
should have been aware, will inevitably have components that are uncertain and
subjective. But the uncertainty and subjectivity involved should be less acute
than that involved in a direct economic inquiry. Indeed, to the extent that the
PTO examiner is herself one of ordinary skill, she simply needs to be made
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000) (“nonobvious[ness]”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“enable[ment]”).
28. See, e.g., In re Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing PTO claim construction).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). The prior invention in the field is called “prior art.” Id.
30. For a discussion of how this has arguably happened in biotechnology and software, see Rai,
Addressing the Patent Gold Rush, supra note 4.
31. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (discussing the need for a “reasonable expectation of success”).
32. See generally Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J.
1, 35–36 (1993) (discussing the importance of considering uncertainty in determining nonobviousness).
33. This argument is probably most accurate in those areas of natural science and engineering that
are relatively well-understood. In those areas, the art and the level of skill in the art tend to be relatively
well-defined. The claim’s accuracy in newly emerging areas such as nanotechnology or in other areas to
which the patent system has extended, such as business methods, is less clear.
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aware of all the prior art.34
Scientifically- and technically-based requirements such as nonobviousness
can thus serve as reasonably good proxies for the ultimate economic inquiry.
Nonetheless, for purposes of meeting the system’s economic goals, the examina-
tion process set up by the Patent Act35 has two deficiencies. First, although
scientifically- and technically-based validity standards may generally be trac-
table proxies for the ultimate economic inquiry, these proxies do not always
capture all of the economic policy reasons for granting a patent. For example, in
some cases, although an invention might be technically obvious, both to try and
to make, it might nonetheless be unusually expensive to make.36 Alternatively,
to the extent that the economic expense or risk associated with developing a
technically obvious invention is substantial, allowing a patent on that invention
could be useful.37 Second, as numerous commentators have long observed, the
ex parte proceedings upon which the PTO generally relies are unlikely to afford
examiners the opportunity to deny even questionable patents.38 Although appli-
cants have an obligation to disclose prior art of which they are aware, they have
no duty to conduct a prior art search.39 Additionally, given the sheer volume of
applications, patent examiners have a very limited amount of time to search for
prior art themselves, or, indeed, to determine the relevance of prior art that may
be submitted to them.40
How to address these deficiencies is not clear. With respect to the second
deficiency noted above, the fact that many individual patent applications will
have only minor market significance in the long term41 probably militates
34. As we discuss further below, the PTO examiner is probably more likely than any other
government actor to have ordinary skill in the art. See infra text accompanying note 246.
35. See generally Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
36. See generally John Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 506 (2003) (discussing this issue
and proposing a standard “which looks more realistically at the actual role of patents as incentives”).
37. See Kitch, supra note 17, at 265–67, 269 (advocating development as a significant reason for
granting patent rights).
38. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal
Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1225–26 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499–1500 (2001); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. &
Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and the Performance of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 13 (2002); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in
the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314–15.
39. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 1499–1500.
40. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 5 (giving estimates of the total amount of time available
to examine a patent application that range from eight to twenty-five hours).
41. The data on market significance, and particularly on licensing, are not as well-developed as one
might hope, but they do suggest that many individual patents have low market value. One recent study
based on a sample of 776 German and 222 U.S. patents found that (in approximate terms) the most
valuable 10% of patents accounted for 80% of the value of the sample. See F.M. Scherer, The
Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR
THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 7–8 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). To the extent that
litigation is seen to be a marker of value, similar “skewness” might be inferred from litigation statistics.
Only about 2% of patents are the subject of litigation. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 1501.
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against expending resources to improve examination procedures for all applica-
tions.42 Hence, calls for reform have properly focused on post-grant review,
which, at least when implemented in the European patent system, tends to target
the relatively small percentage of patents that are likely to be commercially
significant.43 This Article identifies administrative-law-based mechanisms of
judicial review that would allow the U.S. system to take full advantage of the
cost savings and increased accuracy potentially offered by post-grant review. As
for the first problem noted above, there is good reason to be wary of giving any
government institution plenary authority to make relatively free-form inquiries
into economic policy. Thus, consistent with standard administrative law doc-
trine, we would propose dividing authority for policymaking between the PTO
and the courts.
We turn, then, to the administrative law context for our argument. In the next
Part, we discuss how, as a matter of formal doctrine, administrative law
principles currently apply to review of existing PTO proceedings.
II. THE PTO AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINE
In most technically complex areas, administrative law looms large. Federal
statutes, known as organic statutes, create administrative agencies and empower
them to take a range of actions, usually including informal rulemaking and
different types of adjudication. Those organic statutes sometimes specify the
standards that courts should use in reviewing agency actions. Usually, the
organic statute does not, however, specify the standards applicable in all
situations. Indeed, some organic statutes do not specify any standards. Insofar
as the organic statutes do not provide such standards, the regime enunciated in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the governing standards.44
The idea behind the APA was that it would provide the default rules for all
agencies (and both “agency” and “agency action” were defined very broadly in
the APA45), with the result that it would create a new legal regime for agencies
with organic statutes that included little procedure.46 Thus, for any given agency
42. The minimal level of review that should be accorded to every application is difficult to assess.
For a discussion of the problems that could be caused by “low market value” patents of low quality, see
Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System—Design Choices
and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 992–94 (2004); Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy,
supra note 4, at 1082–83.
43. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 42, at 1006 (summarizing studies showing that “particularly
valuable patents are selected with higher likelihood than less valuable ones”).
44. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
45. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (defining “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency,” with only a few narrow
exceptions); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (same); 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (defining “agency action” as “the
whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure to act”).
46. See H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980, at 15 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1944–46, at 250 (stating that Congress intended the APA “to be operative ‘across
the board’ in accordance with its terms, or not at all” and that “[n]o agency has been favored by special
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the central question is the degree to which its organic statute specifies the
relevant standards and thus displaces the APA.47 How does this apply to the
PTO? Strikingly, although the organic statute provides very little guidance, the
Federal Circuit has often failed to apply the APA. In the next sections we
address the application of administrative law doctrine to PTO actions, specifi-
cally patent grants and denials.
A. PATENT LAW AND THE APA: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
At the time of the APA’s enactment in 1946, the patent statute did not contain
any language concerning how PTO actions were to be reviewed by courts. In
the absence of statutory language, regional courts of appeals had enunciated
judicial standards of review as patent common law. Courts had generally
applied a rebuttable presumption of validity with respect to PTO decisions to
grant a patent, but different courts articulated different standards for how the
presumption was to be rebutted.48 As for patent denials, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA)—the predecessor to the Federal Circuit that heard
all appeals from patent denials—failed to enunciate a uniform standard of
review.49 To the extent there was a salient pattern in CCPA review of patent
denials, it was that the CCPA often mentioned agency expertise as a reason for
deference.50 Given the absence of language in the patent statute, and the
absence of a uniform direction in the case law, the APA filled in the gaps and
provided the standard of review—or should have been construed to do so.
Six years after the passage of the APA, Congress passed the Patent Act of
1952.51 The 1952 statute was silent as to patent denials. It did articulate a
presumption of validity for patent grants, but the language stating this presump-
tion was quite sparse. Section 282 of the Patent Act now states that “[a] patent
shall be presumed valid” and that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”52
treatment”); S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 1 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT, 1944–46, at 187 (1946) (stating that the APA would provide a “simple and standard
plan of administrative procedure” that would respond to the “widespread demand for legislation to
settle and regulate the field of Federal administrative law and procedure”).
47. See Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983).
48. See, e.g., Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Lab., 293 U.S. 1, 7 (1934) (noting the presumption
of validity but also noting that “[t]he force of that presumption has found varying expression in this and
other courts”).
49. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155–56, 158, 160 (1999).
50. See id. at 160 (noting that in half of eighty-nine pre-APA cases in its sample, the CCPA
mentioned PTO expertise, and in three-fourths it mentioned that PTO factfinding in denials had been
passed upon by two or sometimes more tribunals).
51. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. II 2002). The 1952 language was even simpler. It provided: “A patent
shall be presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on the party
asserting it.” Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 812. Since 1952, Congress has added
language to section 282, leading to the somewhat more convoluted language quoted in the text.
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This is the only provision of the Patent Act that even plausibly supersedes the
APA for purposes of patent review. Did these provisions in section 282 displace
or modify the APA? The short answer is “no.”
The Supreme Court’s longstanding view has been that agency actions are
presumed valid, and a plaintiff seeking to overcome that presumption has the
burden of establishing invalidity. The Court articulated this view before the
passage of the APA (indeed, in the nineteenth century) and has adhered to it
ever since.53 These provisions of section 282 say no more; they merely confirm
that this presumption and burden also apply to patent grants. So why enact
legislation containing these statements? The congressional materials accompany-
ing the legislation do not shed any light, but the principal drafter of the Patent
Act explained:
The first paragraph of Section 282 declares that a patent shall be presumed
valid and that the burden of establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on a
party asserting it. That a patent is presumed valid was the law prior to the new
statute, but it was not expressed in the old statute.54
Another drafter (who later became a judge on the Federal Circuit) stated that
“[s]ection 282 puts into the statute the presumption of validity for the benefit of
those cynical judges who now say the presumption is the other way around.”55
In other words, section 282 had the modest effect of clarifying that the general
presumption of validity applicable to agency actions was also applicable to
53. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (“Certainly, the
Secretary’s decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity.”); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337
U.S. 86, 101 (1949) (“An administrative order is presumptively valid.”); Thompson v. Consol. Gas
Utils. Co., 300 U.S. 55, 69–70 (1937) (“It is settled that to all administrative regulations purporting to
be made under authority legally delegated there attaches a presumption of the existence of facts
justifying the specific exercise. But, obviously, the proration orders would not be valid if shown to bear
no reasonable relation either to the prevention of waste or the protection of correlative rights, or if
shown to be otherwise arbitrary. The plaintiffs have assumed the heavy burden of overcoming the
presumption and of establishing that the order is an arbitrary taking of their property.” (citing Pac.
States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935))); Pac. States Box & Basket Co., 296 U.S.
at 186 (“[W]here the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of
the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes, to municipal ordinances,
and to orders of administrative bodies.”); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32–33 (1827)
(“When the President exercises an authority confided to him by law, the presumption is, that it is
exercised in pursuance of law. Every public officer is presumed to act in obedience to his duty, until the
contrary is shown; and, a fortiori, this presumption ought to be favourably applied to the chief
magistrate of the Union.”).
54. P. J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 215
(1993) (reprinted from 35 U.S.C.A. (1954 ed.)).
55. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
drafter was Giles Rich, who became Judge Rich. In American Hoist, Judge Rich introduced the
quotation in text by saying, “[t]he named author of this opinion, who also worked on the 1952 act with
Mr. Federico, explained it to the New York Patent Law Association on November 6, 1952 (in a speech
of limited publication) in these words . . . .” Id.
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patent grants.56
Reasonable minds can differ over whether this clarification was necessary.
After all, courts might have reached the same conclusion by applying ordinary
background principles of administrative law. What seems clear, however, is that
section 282 did not supplant the APA. Section 559 of the APA provides in part
that a “[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify [the
APA] . . . except to the extent that it does so expressly.”57 This prevents the
displacing of the APA by implication.58 Nothing in section 282 suggests that it
is superseding the requirements of the APA.59
Even if section 559 did not exist, there would be little basis for treating
section 282 as supplanting the APA. Organic statutes superseding the APA
generally indicate that they are doing so and contain specific standards of
review (for example, “substantial evidence”).60 These provisions tell courts how
56. Indeed, the prominent administrative law opinion United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001), which reviewed a tariff classification decision by the United States Custom Service, relegates to
a footnote the organic statute’s provision that such classifications are “presumed to be correct.” Id. at
2174 n.16 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (2000)). Although some commentators have criticized the
Mead Court for ignoring this provision, these commentators acknowledge that the provision could be
seen as simply placing the burden of proof on the importer who challenges the classification. David J.
Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 220–21.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000).
58. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (“Exemptions from the terms of the
Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in [section 559]
that modifications must be express.” (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 75 (1955)));
Ninilchik Traditional Council v. United States, 227 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting this
language from section 559 and then stating: “This language leaves us to conclude that challenges to
agency actions are subject to the APA’s judicial review standard unless Congress specifies a contrary
intent . . . .”).
59. The main line of cases in which the Supreme Court has found that an organic statute supplanted
the APA is instructive. The statute involved, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66
Stat. 163, 209 (current amended version at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West 2005)), provides that “[t]he
procedure (herein prescribed) shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportabil-
ity of an alien under this section.” As the Supreme Court held, that is the sort of express statement that
does displace the APA. See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 309 (relying on the quoted language in so holding);
see also Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 134 (1991) (same).
60. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000) (“[T]he court shall
hold unlawful and set aside such rule if the court finds that the rule is not supported by substantial
evidence in the rulemaking record . . . .”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000) (prescribing de novo
review for agency determinations under the Freedom of Information Act); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1) (2000)
(directing courts to set aside conclusions of the Merit Systems Protection Board if they are “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . or . . . unsupported by
substantial evidence”); 10 U.S.C. § 1558(f)(3) (2000) (“A court of the United States may review a
recommendation of a special board or an action of the Secretary of the military department concerned
on the report of a special board. In any such case, a court may set aside the action only if the court finds
that the recommendation or action was—(A) arbitrary or capricious; (B) not based on substantial
evidence; (C) a result of material error of fact or material administrative error; or (D) otherwise
contrary to law.”); 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (2000) (“Any party aggrieved by an order of the Board under this
chapter may obtain a review of such order in [a] United States Court of Appeals . . . . The findings of
the Board as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78y(b)(4) (2000) (“The findings of the Commission as to the facts identified by the Commission as
the basis, in whole or in part, of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. The court
282 [Vol. 95:269THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
much evidence (and, often, what kind) challengers must marshal to argue
successfully for the invalidation of an agency action. Such specification both
demonstrates that the organic statute is, indeed, intended to supersede the APA
and also tells courts what sort of review to apply. A lack of specificity deprives
courts of statutory language to guide them in reviewing agency action and thus
underscores that the APA still applies. Without the APA, courts would have no
meaningful statutory guideposts—the precise phenomenon that the APA was
designed to eliminate. Neither section 282 nor any other section of the Patent
Act contains any standards of review for patent grants (or patent denials, for
that matter). There is no language putting forward the quantum of evidence
necessary to support (or, conversely, to overturn) an agency action. All we have
is the bare statement of a presumption of validity, and that does not communi-
cate the relevant standards to the courts.
If section 282 does not supersede the APA, might it nonetheless modify the
APA? Again, section 559 imposes a barrier because even a modification of the
APA must be expressly stated—and, again, the bare language of section 282
does not so indicate. Assuming that section 559 did not exist, how would
section 282 modify the APA? As we will discuss in greater detail in the
following section, under the APA courts review factual determinations in infor-
mal proceedings under an “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”
standard, and review findings of fact in formal proceedings under a “substantial
evidence” standard.61 If the presumption of validity in section 282 modifies
these standards, in which direction does it do so? Does it suggest more
deference to the agency’s decisions on the theory that the presumption was
Congress’s way of saying, “Give more than usual deference to the agency”?
That hypothesis seems unlikely. As we noted above, the longstanding presump-
tion has been that agency actions are presumed valid, with the burden on the
challenger to the agency’s action.
Meanwhile, in contrast to the sparse language of the Patent Act regarding
review of patent grants, its standards for reviewing a patent denial are nonexist-
ent. Section 282 does not apply to patent denials, and no other provision covers
the review of patent denials. Thus, in the context of denials, nothing in the
organic statute even arguably displaces the APA.
The foregoing is boilerplate administrative law. But the courts applying the
Patent Act had other ideas. Despite the passage of the APA, courts did not apply
the APA and instead developed common law to flesh out the sparse language of
shall affirm and enforce the rule unless the Commission’s action in promulgating the rule is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right; or without observance of procedure required by law.”); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(8) (2000) (“[The reviewing] court shall not set aside or remand such order unless there is not
substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole, to support the finding of a violation or unless the
Administrator’s or Secretary’s assessment of the penalty constitutes an abuse of discretion.”).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2000); see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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the Patent Act. Before 1982 (when Congress established the Federal Circuit to
hear all patent appeals), regional courts ignored the APA and referred instead to
section 282. Interestingly, when they applied section 282, they adopted a variety
of different standards—representing a wide range of deference. Some regional
courts of appeals took the presumption to mean that an issued patent could be
invalidated only if the challenger showed “clear and convincing evidence” of
invalidity.62 Others determined that issued patents could be invalidated under a
preponderance of the evidence standard.63 That is, as the discussion above
suggests, section 282 did not give courts much guidance and accordingly the
courts that applied section 282 had varying interpretations of the amount of
deference that it entailed.
The 1982 legislation creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did
not flesh out, or alter, the section 282 standard. The Federal Circuit has
continued the common law trend started by the regional courts—ignoring the
APA and citing section 282. Unlike the regional courts, the Federal Circuit has,
however, uniformly upheld a strong presumption of validity. Specifically, the
court has held that the presumption of validity can be overturned only through
“clear and convincing” evidence, even in cases where the alleged infringer
uncovers information that was not considered by the PTO.64 In the context of
patent denials, the Federal Circuit has also (at least until recently) ignored the
APA.
B. APPLYING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINE TO PTO ACTIONS
Assuming, then, that the APA applies to the PTO, how precisely does it
operate? Agency actions are conventionally broken down into three categories:
fact, law, and policy (with policy sometimes divided into policy decisions and
discretionary acts).65 Although the distinctions between these categories do of
course blur at the margins,66 they represent useful mechanisms for characteriz-
ing different types of agency action. Each category has its own standards of
62. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.06, at 5-697 & n.34 (Supp. 2003) (listing cases that
applied this standard).
63. See, e.g., Mark Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 928–29 & n.28 (2004) (listing cases from the Sixth Circuit applying this
standard).
64. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
65. As we discuss at greater length infra notes 170–74 and accompanying text, policy choices are
discretionary, and the decisions that fall into the “discretionary” category in administrative law are
applications of policy choices. Thus policy choices and discretionary acts can be considered as two
parts of one category. The difference is that policy decisions are broad legislative-like choices, and
discretionary decisions are specific implementations of policy choices.
66. As we discuss below, see infra note 175 and accompanying text, the line between legal
interpretation and policy can sometimes be blurry. Lines can also blur in cases where (as is often the
case in decisions regarding patent validity) law is being applied to factual determinations. Indeed, some
administrative cases from the pre-Chevron era tended to assimilate application of law to fact to the
category of fact. However, the more recent trend in administrative law has been to treat applications of
law to fact as legal determinations. See infra note 135.
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review, so we consider each separately here.
1. Factual Determinations
Factual determinations play a major role in PTO decisionmaking because
they are central to many of the inquiries in which the PTO engages. For
example, as we noted in Part I, the Patent Act requires that a patented invention
be nonobvious. As the Supreme Court emphasized in the 1966 case Graham v.
John Deere Co., the statute specifies a number of factual inquiries that are
necessary to resolve the question of nonobviousness: what the ordinary skill in
the art was at the time of invention; what the relevant prior invention was; and
the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.”67
Turning, then, to judicial review of PTO factfinding, section 706 of the APA
provides the relevant standard. Under section 706, courts review agency find-
ings of fact in informal proceedings to determine if they are “arbitrary, capri-
cious, [or] an abuse of discretion” and review agency findings of fact in formal
proceedings to determine if they are “unsupported by substantial evidence.”68 In
light of the absence of different standards in the Patent Act, these are the
relevant provisions applicable to the PTO.
This conclusion would seem unexceptional to administrative law scholars.
Until the Supreme Court’s intervention in 1999, however, the Federal Circuit
explicitly rejected the application of section 706 to PTO factfinding. In the
context of patent denials, which are appealed directly to the Federal Circuit, the
Federal Circuit instead applied the “clearly erroneous” standard, which is less
deferential to the agency than either of the standards articulated in section
706.69 The Federal Circuit articulated its rationale for this conclusion in In re
Zurko.70 The court relied on a portion of section 559 of the APA, which
provides in part that the statute does “not limit or repeal additional requirements
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.”71 The Federal Circuit in
67. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2000). The Supreme Court has not resolved the question of whether
these sections differ in the quantum of evidence necessary to support an agency factfinding. When he
was on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Scalia wrote an opinion holding that “arbitrary [or] capricious”
under section 706(2)(E) entailed the same degree of judicial scrutiny as did “substantial evidence”
under section 706(2)(E). Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Note that even if the two provisions entail the same level
of deference, they clearly differ as to the kind of record that is involved. As then-Judge Scalia
emphasized, formal proceedings are confined to the evidence presented at the hearing, but informal
proceedings are not so limited. Id. at 683. As it happens, this distinction has become quite important for
the Federal Circuit. See infra notes 80–97 and accompanying text.
69. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that “clearly erroneous” is less
deferential than the APA standards of review), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999);
see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999) (same).
70. 142 F.3d at 1452.
71. See 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000). Note that this is the section of the APA that also provides that a
subsequent statute will not supersede the APA unless it does so expressly. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
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Zurko stated that, prior to the enactment of the APA, courts reviewed PTO
findings of fact in patent denials under the clearly erroneous standard, and it
concluded that this judicial practice constituted an “additional requiremen-
t[] . . . recognized by law.”72 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
clearly erroneous standard applied to the PTO notwithstanding section 706.73
This reasoning was striking, because a total of only eight federal cases had
invoked the “repeal additional requirements” language in the more than fifty
years between the passage of the APA and Zurko. Moreover, in each of those
cases the “additional requirements” took the form of a statutory provision (in
the relevant organic statute) that conflicted with a provision of the APA, rather
than a line of judicial opinions that conflicted with the APA.74 Indeed, in all of
those cases the court found that the statutory provision in the organic statute
controlled. The court’s invocation of section 559 simply buttressed the general
rule that the organic statute controls where it provides specific standards of
review.75
That the Federal Circuit’s position lacked a judicial antecedent made it
unprecedented, but not necessarily wrong. It might be that the best reading of
“additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law”
encompasses standards of review arising from an established line of cases. As
the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko emphasized, however, the problem for
the Federal Circuit was that the pre-APA cases did not establish clearly errone-
ous review as the relevant standard.76 The cases used varying word formula-
72. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452.
73. See id. at 1457 (applying the common law tradition of “clear error”).
74. See infra note 75.
75. The eight cases were: United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973) (citing
section 559 for the proposition that a provision in the organic statute could require the agency to hold
an oral hearing even though the APA did not so require); Pan-Atl. S.S. Corp. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R.
Co., 353 U.S. 436, 446 n.5 (1957) (citing a predecessor to section 559 in support of its statement that
“[a]n earlier special statute controls over a later general statute”); United States v. Menendez, 48 F.3d
1401, 1409 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing section 559 for the proposition that the specific language in the
Endangered Species Act controlled); Gostovich v. Valore, 257 F.2d 144, 145–46 (3d Cir. 1958) (citing
section 559 in support of its holding that a statutory limitation of ten dollars for compensation to an
attorney handling a veteran’s claim controlled over a general provision of the APA regarding representa-
tion by counsel); SEC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 209 F.2d 44, 48–49 (3d Cir. 1953) (citing a
predecessor to section 559 in support of its holding that a specific statute regarding attorneys’
representation before the SEC controlled over a general provision of the APA regarding representation
by counsel); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir. 1949) (citing a predecessor
to section 559 for the proposition that a general provision of the APA does not control in light of a
specific provision in the organic statute); Rolla Cable Sys., Inc. v. City of Rolla, 761 F. Supp. 1398,
1404 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (noting one party’s argument that application of the APA would override a more
specific statute and thus run afoul of section 559); SEC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 113 F. Supp. 85,
90 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (citing section 559 in support of its holding that a specific statute regarding
attorneys’ representation before the SEC controlled over a general provision of the APA regarding
representation by counsel).
76. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (“[W]e have examined the 89 cases which,
according to respondents and supporting amici, embody the pre-APA standard of review . . . and we
conclude that those cases do not reflect a well-established stricter court/court standard of judicial review
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tions, rather than using “clearly erroneous” as a term of art. Indeed, with respect
to the CCPA cases reviewing patent denials, “not one of the 89 opinions actually
uses the precise words ‘clear error’ or ‘clearly erroneous,’ which are terms of art
signaling court/court review.”77 Similarly, as we noted earlier, pre-APA cases
reviewing patent grants did not establish consistent standards of review.
The absence of a consistent standard of review for patent-related factfinding
is not surprising. A big part of the impetus behind the passage of the APA was
that courts had not created clear standards to govern their review of agency
actions.78 As it turns out, review of the PTO was no exception. So, more than
half a century after the enactment of the APA, the Supreme Court instructed the
Federal Circuit that the APA does indeed provide the governing standards for
the judicial review of PTO factfinding that underlies patent denials.
The Federal Circuit managed to find the path of less deference, however. The
Supreme Court in Zurko was not squarely presented with, and hence did not
address, the specific question of whether PTO factfinding should be reviewed
under the “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard applicable to informal proceed-
ings or the “substantial evidence” standard applicable to formal proceedings.79
When the issue arose at oral argument, Justice Breyer suggested that arbitrary or
capricious review was the proper choice given the ex parte, informal nature of
the PTO proceedings.80 But Justice Breyer’s opinion for the majority addressed
only the threshold issue of APA applicability briefed by the parties.81
In In re Gartside, the Federal Circuit confronted the question whether
“arbitrary [or] capricious” or “substantial evidence” was the appropriate stan-
dard.82 The court began its analysis by stating that “arbitrary [or] capricious” is
the most deferential standard of review under the APA, “analyz[ing] only
whether a rational connection exists between the agency’s factfindings and its
ultimate action.”83 The court characterized “substantial evidence,” by contrast,
as “a less deferential review standard than ‘arbitrary, capricious’”—one that
required more than a rational connection.84
This is a contested construction of “arbitrary [or] capricious” and “substantial
evidence.” As the opinion in In re Gartside noted, there is some case law in
support of it. But the court did not acknowledge, much less discuss, case law
for PTO factfinding, which circumstance fatally undermines the Federal Circuit’s conclusion.” (internal
citation omitted)).
77. Id. at 158.
78. As the Supreme Court noted in Zurko, “[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of
variation and diversity. It would frustrate that purpose to permit divergence on the basis of a
requirement ‘recognized’ only as ambiguous.” Id. at 155.
79. Id. at 154.
80. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *4–*8, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (No.
98-377), available at 1999 WL 190969 (asserting that the “arbitrary-capricious standard . . . applies to
all determinations . . . not based on a closed record”).
81. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154.
82. 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 1312.
84. Id.
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indicating that the two terms provide exactly the same level of deference.
Indeed, the most widely cited—and followed—case on this question, by then-
Judge Scalia for the D.C. Circuit, held that “arbitrary [or] capricious” and
“substantial evidence” entail the same (very great) level of deference to agency
factfinding.85
The Gartside court’s distinction between the deference entailed by “substan-
tial evidence” and that entailed by “arbitrary [or] capricious” proved to be
significant, in light of the court’s subsequent determination regarding which
standard applies to the PTO. Section 706(2)(A) provides “arbitrary [or] capri-
cious” review as the default, and section 706(2)(E) sets out a particular circum-
stance where “substantial evidence” instead will apply: “in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute.”86 Determining which provision applies to
the PTO might seem easy: section 706(2)(E) applies to formal proceedings,87
which means oral hearings in which evidence is presented to a presiding officer
(usually an administrative judge); the parties have the right to present evidence,
present rebuttals, and to cross-examine; and the officer’s decision must be based
on the record.88 On this reading, the second half of section 706(2)(E) would
apply to similar oral hearings that are created by an organic statute but are not
specifically subject to sections 556 and 557. That is, the two halves of section
706(2)(E) appear to apply to formal hearings, whether covered by sections 556
and 557 or by the relevant organic statute. On this understanding, no PTO
action would be subject to section 706(2)(E) because there are no formal,
on-the-record hearings in the PTO.89
The Federal Circuit had other ideas. In Gartside, it acknowledged that the
85. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745
F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating the difference between these tests is “largely semantic”
(citation omitted)); see also Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d 222, 241 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2003) (adopting this conclusion from Association of Data Processing Service Organizations); IBP,
Inc. v. Herman, 144 F.3d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Coteau Props. Co. v. Dep’t of Interior, 53
F.3d 1466, 1483 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575
(10th Cir. 1994) (same); cf. supra note 69 (noting that the “clearly erroneous standard” entails less
deference than either standard of review under section 706).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2000). Note that section 706(2)(A) is the catch-all default not only for
factual findings but also for other determinations. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., 745 F.2d at
683 (noting that section 706(2)(A) is a “catchall, picking up administrative misconduct not covered by
the other more specific paragraphs”); infra notes 182–88.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
88. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(b), (d), 557 (2000) (laying out these requirements). Some formal hearings
do not have to be oral, but none of the exceptions applies to patent decisions. Specifically, “[i]n rule
making or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses an agency may,
when a party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the
evidence in written form.” § 556(d) (emphasis added).
89. See Thomas G. Field Jr., Zurko, Gartside and Lee: How Might They Affect Patent Prosecution?,
44 IDEA 221, 225 (2004) (“35 U.S.C. § 32 cases aside, all PTO adjudications, statutory and
non-statutory, are ‘informal.’”). This statute deals with suspending or excluding lawyers from practice
before the PTO if they have committed some transgression, and so it is not relevant to the PTO
determinations on which we focus in this Article. See 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2000 and Supp. II 2002).
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PTO did not conduct proceedings under sections 556 and 557. It found,
however, that PTO proceedings satisfied the second half of section 706(2)(E)
because one statutory provision says that the Federal Circuit “shall review the
decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and
Trademark Office,”90 and another provision refers to an appeal being “heard”
and to a “rehearing”91 (though it does not use the word “hearing”).92 One
problem with this reasoning, as Justice Breyer noted at oral argument in Zurko,
is that it is inconsistent with the longstanding practice of reviewing factfinding
in informal rulemakings and informal adjudications under arbitrary or capri-
cious review.93 In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) provided that the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) shall “review” examiners’ decisions, rather
than requiring a “hearing.”94 This may seem like a small point, but in a closely
related context it has loomed large: Courts have found that the absence of an
explicit requirement of a “hearing” means that an adjudication is informal under
section 554 of the APA.95 Statutes routinely require an agency “hearing,” and
courts have found that the absence of that magic word is significant. It also
bears noting that, if the substantial evidence standard were appropriate for
review of PTO patent denials, that would probably mean that patent denials
would be the sort of adjudication to which the Federal Circuit had to give
Chevron deference—that is, significant deference on the ultimate legal question
of validity.96
Although the substantial evidence standard is, when applied properly, rela-
tively lenient, the standard is supposed to apply only to formal adjudicative
90. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and
Trademark Office.”).
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1994) (current version codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2000 & Supp. II
2002)) (“The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review
adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for patents and shall determine priority and patentabil-
ity of invention in interferences declared under section 135(a) of this title. Each appeal and interference
shall be heard by at least three members of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, who shall be
designated by the Commissioner. Only the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has the authority
to grant rehearings.”).
92. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313 (relying on the 1994 codification of these provisions in holding
that PTO proceedings satisfy section 706(2)(E)).
93. Transcript of Oral Argument at *5–*7, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (No. 98-377),
available at 1999 WL 190969.
94. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313. Note that the current version of section 7(b)—codified at 35
U.S.C. § 6(b)—uses the language of “review[ing].”
95. See John F. Stanley, The “Magic Words” of § 554: A New Test for Formal Adjudication Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1073–75 (2005). Indeed, the debate has been
whether a statute needs to require a “hearing” or a “hearing on the record” in order to entail formal,
rather than informal, adjudication. Compare Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872,
876–78 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that a statute requiring a “hearing” thereby entails formal adjudication),
with City of W. Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 644–45 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that a statute must
require a hearing “on the record” in order to entail formal adjudication); see also Citizens to Pres.
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414–15 (1971).
96. See infra notes 122–58 and accompanying text.
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proceedings, where witnesses are called, evidence is taken, and a full eviden-
tiary record is developed. Highly aggressive application of this standard to the
PTO’s informal proceedings—where the only formal evidence on which the
PTO can rely to make the case against patentability is written prior art97—yields
the paradoxical result of rigorous review.
Consider, for example, the determination of nonobviousness. To the tradi-
tional interpretation of the nonobviousness standard set out by the Supreme
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,98 the Federal Circuit has added a controver-
sial requirement—now the subject of a case on which the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in its 2006 term99—that the examiner show a motivation to
combine prior art references.100 Like many inquiries surrounding nonobvious-
ness, questions regarding motivation to combine are questions of fact.101 In the
2002 case of In re Lee, a panel of the Federal Circuit applied the substantial
evidence standard to mandate that the PTO include in the record explicit
documentary evidence of a motivation to combine.102 In that case, the PTO
argued that “common knowledge and common sense” would motivate the
ordinary artisan who wanted to produce a demonstration mode for adjusting a
video display to combine prior art containing such a video demonstration mode
with prior art showing a menu display that could be used to adjust pictures.103
The Lee court rejected the PTO’s argument, holding that such “‘[c]ommon
knowledge and common sense,’ even if assumed to derive from [the PTO’s]
expertise” did not represent the sort of evidence within “the four corners of the
record” required by Gartside.104 Under boilerplate administrative law, however,
informal adjudications simply do not produce formal records subject to substan-
tial evidence review.
Additionally, even assuming substantial evidence were the appropriate stan-
dard, Lee fails to apply this standard properly. In proceedings subject to
substantial evidence review, the APA allows administrators to take official
notice of certain facts.105 Moreover, under standard administrative law doctrine,
97. While patent applicants can submit affidavits authored by their own experts, there is no
provision in the PTO examination procedure for the use of external experts. Thus the PTO cannot
request affidavits from its own outside experts.
98. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (addressing the scope of “nonobviousness”).
99. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 119 F.App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion), cert.
granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 31713 (June 26, 2006) (No. 04-1350).
100. See KSR Int’l Co., 119 F.App’x at 288.
101. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
102. See 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating the need for “specialized knowledge and
expertise” that is “articulated and placed on the record”).
103. Id. at 1341.
104. Id. at 1344–45 (asserting that such “common knowledge” cannot be a “substitute for author-
ity”); id. at 1342 (stating the rule that “Board decisions ‘must be justified within the four corners of the
record’” (quoting In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
105. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2000) (“When an agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity
to show the contrary.”).
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official notice is broader than judicial notice. Although both doctrines allow
adjudicators to take account of commonly acknowledged facts, official notice
also allows an administrative agency to take notice of technical or scientific
facts that are known within the agency’s area of expertise.106 The Federal
Circuit’s predecessor, the CCPA, had endorsed a limited form of the official
notice doctrine in its review of PTO decisionmaking.107 In Lee, however, Judge
Newman rejected even the limited form of official notice recognized by the
CCPA.108 Lee is, therefore, squarely inconsistent with standard administrative
law.109
The Lee case is not an isolated phenomenon. The Zurko litigation itself
represents a situation where the Federal Circuit rejected the PTO’s specialized
expertise. On remand, the Federal Circuit applied the Gartside standard and
found that the PTO could not use statements of “basic knowledge” possessed by
one having ordinary skill in the art to meet its evidentiary burden of showing a
motivation to combine.110 Similarly, in its 2004 In re Beasley decision, a panel
of the Federal Circuit emphasized that the PTO must have documentary evi-
dence to support arguments that an ordinary artisan would have been motivated
106. See McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Official notice, rather than judicial
notice, is the proper method by which agency decisionmakers may apply knowledge not included in the
record. The Administrative Procedure Act allows a decisionmaker to take ‘official notice’ of material
not appearing in the evidence in the record. Official notice is a broader concept than judicial notice.
Both doctrines allow adjudicators to take notice of commonly acknowledged facts, but official notice
also allows an administrative agency to take notice of technical or scientific facts that are within the
agency’s area of expertise.” (citation omitted)); de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th
Cir. 1994) (quoting McLeod and applying similar reasoning); see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529
U.S. 277, 298 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that the agency is not confined to the evidence in the
record and may take official notice of facts within its special knowledge); Jim Rossi, Judicial Review of
Issues of Fact, in A GUIDE TO POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 159, 171–75 (John
Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (discussing the breadth of official notice).
107. See, e.g., In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (noting that the examiner could, in
reaching a conclusion of obviousness, rely on “common knowledge and common sense of the person of
ordinary skill in the art”). Bozek notwithstanding, the official notice doctrine endorsed by the CCPA
generally extended only to facts generally known to lay persons—of the type that could be recognized
under judicial notice. See, e.g., In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (using the term
“judicial notice” and stating that it extends only to facts that “are capable of such instant and
unquestionable demonstration as to defy dispute”); see also John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the
Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727,
753 (2002) (arguing that certain CCPA cases may allow for aggressive use of official notice in rejecting
patents on trivial business methods).
108. In re Lee, 277 F.3d at 1345 (rejecting the PTO’s arguments regarding CCPA decisions and
limiting the reach of Bozek).
109. At certain points in the Lee opinion, Judge Newman attempts to find support in Supreme Court
case law on “reasoned decisionmaking.” See id. at 1344 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 469 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). However, this case law on reasoned decisionmaking
relates to policy determinations made by agencies, see infra Part II.B.3, and does not in any way call
into question the doctrine of official notice. See infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
110. In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Board cannot simply reach
conclusions based on its own understanding or experience—or on its assessment of what would be
basic knowledge or common sense. Rather, the Board must point to some concrete evidence in the
record in support of these findings.”).
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to combine references.111 As Judge Dyk’s dissent in that case pointed out, the
majority opinion failed to allow any room for the PTO’s specialized knowledge
regarding what an ordinary artisan would know—even in a case where this
knowledge was clearly presented to the applicant and left uncontradicted by
anything other than “lawyer argument.”112
To be sure, as Judge Dyk’s dissent indicates, Federal Circuit judges are
hardly unanimous in resisting the deferential review mandated by the Supreme
Court decision in Zurko. Indeed, as we discuss further, in Part IV.C, we believe
that the Supreme Court decision has made a difference in Federal Circuit
decisionmaking. Post-Zurko, various Federal Circuit judges have authored opin-
ions that are quite deferential to PTO factfinding. Some of these opinions even
appear to apply, at least de facto, a standard of arbitrary and capricious review.
For example, in the 2003 case In re Berg, a Federal Circuit panel affirmed a
decision by the PTO to reject as obvious, over the combination of various prior
art references, an applicant’s claim to a novel fusion protein.113 The Berg court
did not specifically invoke the “motivation to combine” requirement, instead
stating that it would defer to the PTO’s expert judgment regarding what the
prior art references would motivate the person skilled in the art of biotechnol-
ogy to do.114 And a 2006 opinion, In re Kahn, noted that the PTO can find
motivation to combine in sources other than documentary evidence.115 The
Kahn court agreed with the PTO’s assertion that the nature of the problem to be
solved provided the requisite motivation to combine references for creating the
advanced reading machine for the blind claimed in the case.116
Kahn is, however, simply a panel opinion, with no greater precedential value
than any other panel opinion. Moreover, the opinion cites Lee approvingly.117
And the PTO appears to have erred on the side of caution in interpreting the
somewhat confusing signals sent by the Federal Circuit.118 Its Manual of Patent
111. 117 F.App’x 739, 744 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion).
112. Id. at 745–46 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
113. 320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
114. See id. (stating that “examiners and administrative patent judges on the Board are responsible
for making findings . . . as to the meaning of prior art references”).
115. 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
116. Id. at 989.
117. See, e.g., id. at 988 (citing Lee for the proposition that “articulated reasoning” is required to
reject a patent on obviousness grounds).
118. A forthcoming article reviewing cases in which the Federal Circuit has explicitly discussed a
motivation to combine requirement argues that the court tends to require written documentation if the
case involves complex technology. See Christopher Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Eviden-
tiary Lens: The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence (Tulane Pub. Law Research Paper No. 06-03,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract893965. Leaving aside the issue of normative attractive-
ness (it is not clear, for example, why artisans in complex areas should be required to provide written
documentation of knowledge that represents common sense any more than artisans in less complex
areas), this argument is open to question as a descriptive matter. The Kahn case arguably involves
technology that is quite complex. Moreover, cases such as Berg are combination cases involving
technology that is quite complex. Berg is presumably excluded from Cotropia’s analysis because the
decision does not explicitly discuss the motivation to combine test. This results in a skewed sample: if
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Examining Procedure prominently cites the statements in Lee and the Zurko
case on remand to caution examiners against statements of official notice that
are “unsupported by documentary evidence.”119
On first examination, given that section 282 does not displace the APA, it
might appear that a parallel arbitrary and capricious standard also applies to
judicial review of factfinding in PTO patent grants. However, administrative
law doctrine allows—and, indeed, may require—differentiation between grants
and denials. There is good reason to believe that courts, including the Supreme
Court, sometimes tailor review of agency decisions to the rigor of the agency
process. Indeed, in the Dickinson v. Zurko case itself, the Court noted that “the
presence of internal agency review [is one factor that] will often prove more
influential in respect to outcome than will the applicable standard of review.”120
At the PTO, factfinding in the context of denials goes through precisely the sort
of internal agency review to which the Zurko opinion alludes. As discussed
further below,121 a denial by the patent examiner is reviewed by the BPAI, and
this Board reverses a very significant percentage of examiner determinations.
Moreover, unlike appeals of patent denials, which do not typically involve new
prior art, challenges to patent grants generally involve new prior art (or other
factual information) on which the PTO has not articulated a position. Under
standard administrative law doctrine (and as a matter of logic), no deference can
be owed to factfinding that the PTO has not done. Thus, to the extent that, as a
normative matter, we want courts to treat factfinding in PTO denials and grants
asymmetrically, administrative law doctrine provides for that result. We discuss
these issues further in Part IV.
2. Legal Determinations
With respect to judicial review of legal determinations, the language of the
APA itself has played a relatively small role in the major Supreme Court cases.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.122 did not even
cite the APA, and in United States v. Mead Corp.,123 the Court invoked the APA
but did not primarily rely on it.124 This does not mean, however, that the broad
application of administrative law standards that characterizes review of factfind-
ing is absent in the case of review of legal determinations. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court has put forward a set of standards of review for agency legal
certain judges on the Federal Circuit want to avoid aggressive review, they will simply omit explicit
discussion of the test.
119. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2144.03(B) (8th ed. 2005).
120. 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999).
121. See infra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
122. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
123. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
124. See id. at 227, 229; see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77
TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–91 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court’s Chevron opinion did not mention or
consider the APA).
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interpretations that apply to all such interpretations by all agencies, unless
Congress specifically provides otherwise.125 Thus, as with findings of fact,
lower courts are not free to fashion their own standards or modify existing ones
in the context of particular agencies. The same broad principles of administra-
tive law apply to all agencies—including, of course, the PTO.
Before 2000, many courts and commentators believed that Chevron applied
when an agency interpreted a statute that it administered in the course of a final,
authoritative agency action.126 The only significant exception to this rule in-
volved legal interpretations made in regulations by agencies that did not have
authority to issue regulations.127 Under Chevron, if the statute is clear, then
courts do not defer and instead must give effect to congressional intent; if the
statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific issue, then courts defer to the
agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable.128 The relevance for entities
like the PTO was that, before 2000, it seemed that its interpretations of the
Patent Act (which it is authorized to administer through adjudication) would
generally be subject to Chevron deference when those interpretations were
contained in its adjudications of patent validity.129
In the 2000 case of Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court held
that agency opinion letters were not entitled to Chevron deference.130 More
dramatically, in its 2001 Mead opinion, the Court narrowed the scope of
Chevron deference.131 The precise import of the Mead decision, particularly as
interpreted through the Court’s subsequent decision in Barnhart v. Walton,132
has been the subject of vigorous scholarly commentary.133 However, a few basic
125. See infra text accompanying notes 126–139.
126. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
838–39 (2001) (describing the very broad role that most courts and commentators assumed Chevron
played); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2093
(1990) (“Chevron might be taken to suggest that whenever an agency is entrusted with implementing
power—whether to be exercised through rulemaking or adjudication—agency interpretations in the
course of exercising that power are entitled to respect so long as they are reasonable.”).
127. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (rejecting EEOC’s claim that Title
VII applies extraterritorially in part because the agency did not deserve significant deference due to the
fact that Congress failed to grant rulemaking authority to the agency).
128. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
129. See Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush, supra note 4, at 225 n.95 (citing INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999), for the proposition that non-rulemaking agencies entrusted with
adjudicatory power were entitled to deference for interpretations issued during adjudication, formal or
informal). Although Mead appears to suggest that the Aguirre-Aguirre case involved formal adjudica-
tion, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.12 (2001), this suggestion is misleading.
130. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
131. See generally Mead, 533 U.S. 218.
132. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
133. See generally, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force
of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807 (2002); Cass
R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006); Adrian Vermuele, Introduction: Mead in
the Trenches, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003).
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principles are clear. As an initial matter, the Court’s position is that the default
judicial treatment of agency legal interpretations of an unclear statute134 is that
articulated in the 1944 case Skidmore v. Swift & Co.135 Mead found that
Skidmore applies except “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority.”136 In those circumstances, Chevron applies. The emphasis that
the Mead Court placed on congressional intent to delegate authority led it to
conclude that the precise determination of when Chevron deference applies
would be specific to particular statutes. Nonetheless, the Court stated “[i]t is fair
to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronounce-
ment of such force.”137 The Court then suggested that either informal rulemak-
ing or formal adjudication would ordinarily satisfy this standard.138 Similarly,
although the opinion in Barnhart emphasized the need for case-by-case in-
quiry,139 the Court did not disturb the principle that formal procedure was
134. If a statute is clear, then courts do not defer to the agency’s legal determination. See Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). This is known as “Chevron step one” because that
case articulated two steps (the second entails very great deference to agency interpretations of an
unclear statute). The notion that courts do not defer if the statute is clear did not start with Chevron.
Chevron’s innovation was its holding that, if the statute does not speak to the precise question at issue,
then courts permit any reasonable agency interpretation. See id. at 843.
It may be that the level of clarity necessary to satisfy Chevron step one (meaning that Congress has
already answered the relevant question) is different from the level of clarity necessary to satisfy the
clarity question for Skidmore/Mead, but the Court did not address this question in Mead. For an
argument that step one is the same in both contexts, see Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective
Exercise of Discretion, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 771, 778–81 (2002).
135. See 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (asserting a sliding scale balancing test for deference). The Mead
Court’s focus on Skidmore is significant for another reason. Some pre-Chevron cases other than
Skidmore had distinguished pure questions of law from applications of law to fact (sometimes called
mixed questions of law and fact), according no deference to the former and substantial deference to the
latter. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (a pre-APA case according no
deference to a pure question of law and substantial deference to an application of law to fact); Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (same). But see Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947)
(according no deference to an application of law to fact, involving the same statute that was at issue in
Hearst); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 433–35 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that “[e]ven today,
Packard is widely viewed as inconsistent with at least Hearst” because it did not defer to the NLRB’s
application of law to fact). Mead did not cite to any of those cases or mention the possible revival of
that distinction, and instead applied Skidmore deference to the legal determination in that case—a legal
determination that was an application of law to fact. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 237–38. Thus Mead does
not support drawing a distinction between pure legal questions and mixed questions. See Barron &
Kagan, supra note 56, at 226 (stating that “Mead does not revive the distinction between pure questions
of law and mixed questions of law and fact that in part determined the level of deference prior to
Chevron”).
136. 533 U.S. at 226–27.
137. Id. at 230.
138. Id. at 230–31.
139. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (emphasizing factors such as the “interstitial
nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
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sufficient (if not always necessary) to infer congressional delegation and hence
Chevron deference.
As a conceptual matter, the difference between the approach taken by Skid-
more and Chevron deference is nontrivial. Skidmore stated that “[t]he weight
[accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”140 As the Court noted in
Mead, Skidmore entails a sliding scale of weight for an agency’s determination
from “great respect” to “near indifference,” depending on factors like the
agency’s consistency in maintaining its interpretation and the thoroughness of
its procedures.141 By contrast, under Chevron, courts will defer to “a reasonable
interpretation” of an unclear statute, regardless of the thoroughness of its
reasoning or its consistency with earlier or later pronouncements.142 Indeed, in
Chevron itself the agency legal interpretation at issue conflicted with earlier
interpretations the agency had made (and thus would have been entitled to little
deference under Skidmore), but the Supreme Court deferred nonetheless.143
Unsurprisingly, agency interpretations of statutes deemed to be unclear are
almost always “reasonable,” and thus permissible, under the Chevron analy-
administration of the statute, . . . and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time”).
140. 323 U.S. at 140; see Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (stating that “Justice Jackson summed things up in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.” and then quoting this exact language); id. (“The fair measure of deference to
an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts
have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to
the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”).
141. 533 U.S. at 228. Justice Scalia, in his Mead dissent, suggested that Skidmore deference is more
apparent than real. See id. at 247 (“Skidmore deference gives the agency’s current position some vague
and uncertain amount of respect . . . .”); id. at 250 (“[T]he rule of Skidmore deference is an empty
truism and a trifling statement of the obvious . . . .”); id. at 241 (“The Court has largely replaced
Chevron, in other words, with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most
feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”); id. at
239 (referring to “so-called Skidmore deference”). But, Justice Scalia overstates the case. Skidmore is
not across-the-board deference like Chevron is, to be sure, but it still directs courts to defer to
judgments that they would not reach in the first instance where the agency has followed procedures that
tend to show that the agency itself has acted with care.
142. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
143. Id. at 853–59 (noting changes in EPA interpretations of the statutory term “source”). Matz v.
Household International Tax Reduction Investment Plan, 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), presents a
particularly clear example of the difference in outcomes that can result from the application of
Skidmore deference instead of Chevron deference. In that case, the Seventh Circuit (shortly before
Mead was decided) found that Chevron deference applied to an IRS interpretation (presented in an
amicus brief), and it found the interpretation reasonable under Chevron. The Supreme Court remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Mead. On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that, in light of
Mead, the IRS interpretation was entitled only to Skidmore deference, and it found the interpretation
unpersuasive under Skidmore. Id. at 575–76. We discuss the general question of whether changes in
levels of deference affect outcomes in Part IV.
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sis.144 In fact, in the more than twenty years since the Chevron test has been in
force, only two Supreme Court cases have held that an administrative interpreta-
tion of an unclear statute was unreasonable and hence invalid.145
For many agencies, the relevant organic statutes often do not speak precisely
to the question at issue. Similarly, the patent statute’s standards for patent
validity allow for some legal interpretation. For example, as we discussed
earlier, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the language of the patent statute’s
nonobviousness standard to allow for patentability where an invention is “obvi-
ous to try” but nonetheless has only a limited possibility of success.146 The
Supreme Court has also engaged in legal interpretation of the patent statute
regarding nonobviousness. It has held that courts may invoke various “second-
ary considerations”—“commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure
of others, etc.” as proxies for technical nonobviousness.147 Although these
secondary considerations are not mentioned in the statutory language, the
Supreme Court treats them as a mechanism for determining the issue of
technical obviousness that is mentioned in the statute. Legal interpretation most
often comes into play because patent validity determinations such as nonobvious-
ness require the application of legal standards to underlying factual findings.
Under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, Chevron applies both to pure ques-
tions of legal interpretation and to the interpretation involved in applying legal
standards to factual findings, and nothing in Mead suggests a differentiation
between pure and applied interpretations.148
Thus, when the PTO makes a determination of patent validity, it engages not
only in factfinding but also in legal interpretation—the application of law to
fact. So how does the choice between Chevron and Skidmore play out for the
PTO? In contrast to most agencies that regulate areas characterized by technical
complexity, the PTO generally engages in neither of the proceedings—informal
rulemaking or formal adjudication—that the Mead Court indicated would clearly
merit deference. First, unlike most significant agencies, the PTO does not have
any significant substantive rulemaking authority. Federal statutes give the PTO
authority to make rules on a variety of procedural matters (for example, how
144. As many commentators have noted, the central hurdle in Chevron cases is clarity—i.e., did
Congress answer the relevant question, such that there is no reason to look to the agency’s interpreta-
tion. See Rebecca Hanner White, Arbitration and the Administrative State, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1283, 1310 (2003) (discussing the importance and centrality of the determination whether the statute is
clear).
145. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 481 (2001); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999). This is not to suggest, however, that agencies always win under
Chevron. Agencies often lose under Chevron’s first step, which asks whether Congress has directly
spoken to the relevant issue. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
132–33 (2000) (rejecting the agency’s interpretation at Chevron step one).
146. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
147. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
148. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (applying Chevron to an agency’s
application of law to fact); supra note 135 (discussing Mead’s lack of support for a distinction between
pure questions of law and applications of law to fact).
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much money to charge applicants) and in a few specified substantive contexts
(for instance, with respect to rejected patent applications, “[t]he Director shall
prescribe regulations to provide for the continued examination of applications
for patent at the request of the applicant.”)149 But the statutes contain no general
grant of substantive rulemaking authority, and thus the PTO lacks the power to
issue binding rules setting out general requirements for patents.150 Second, the
PTO does not conduct adjudications that would qualify as formal adjudications
for APA purposes. Formal adjudications under the APA are trial-type oral
hearings conducted by an impartial presiding officer in which the parties are
entitled to present evidence and cross-examine, and the officer’s decision must
be based solely on the record.151 The PTO does have explicit authority to
administer the patent statute through adjudications of individual patents, but it
has no proceedings that bear these hallmarks of formal adjudication.152
The Mead Court did explicitly leave open the possibility that Chevron
deference could apply to agency actions that did not constitute either informal
rulemakings or formal adjudications but nonetheless did entail a congressional
“delegat[ion] [of] authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law.”153 And the PTO is of course authorized to make legally binding
determinations—that is, determinations of patentability—via informal adjudica-
tion. But Mead suggests that an agency action that lacks precedential value does
not have the “force of law.”154 It also indicates that decisions such as tariff
rulings that are “churned out” at high frequency by low-level officials are
unlikely to have the “force of law.”155 The tariff rulings at issue in Mead bear a
149. 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2000). The broadest rulemaking authority conferred on the PTO is
delineated in 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), and even that authority is fairly narrow, focusing on the PTO’s
internal procedures. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000) (providing that the PTO may establish regulations
“govern[ing] the conduct of proceedings in the Office, . . . facilitat[ing] and expedit[ing] the processing
of patent applications, . . . govern[ing] the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before the Office, . . . recogniz[ing] the public interest
in continuing to safeguard broad access to the United States patent system through the reduced fee
structure for small entities . . . and provid[ing] for the development of a performance-based process that
includes quantitative and qualitative measures and standards for evaluating cost-effectiveness and is
consistent with the principles of impartiality and competitiveness.”).
150. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he broadest of
the PTO’s rulemaking powers . . . authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only
to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to
issue substantive rules. Because Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substan-
tive rulemaking power, the ‘Final Determination’ at issue in this case cannot possibly have the ‘force
and effect of law.’” (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979); Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (internal citations omitted)).
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2000). As we noted above, the APA permits some formal hearings to be
based on written submissions, but none of the exceptions applies to patent decisions. See supra note 88.
152. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2000) (stating that the Patent and Trademark Office “shall be
responsible for the granting and issuing of patents and the registration of trademarks”).
153. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 230–31 (2001).
154. Id. at 232–33 (emphasizing precedential value, and the importance of the challenged adjudica-
tions’ lack of precedential value, in determining that Chevron deference did not apply to them).
155. Id. at 233.
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striking resemblance to patent grants by PTO examiners. PTO patent grants lack
precedential value, and the four thousand examiners who work at the PTO grant
almost 150,000 of them per year.156 Thus PTO legal interpretations issued in the
context of grants are probably subject to the sliding scale of Skidmore defer-
ence.
With respect to legal interpretations issued in patent denials, the issue is less
clear. Unlike patent grants, patent denials have to go through several layers of
internal agency review—internal review at the BPAI as well as a decision by the
PTO’s Solicitor General to defend an appeal to the Federal Circuit. So patent
denials might be entitled to Chevron deference. But even if Skidmore is the
correct approach, it would mandate more deference in the case of a denial,
where the PTO’s decisionmaking has gone through several layers of internal
agency review, and less deference in the case of a grant, where such internal
processes do not exist.
The Federal Circuit’s actual decisions with respect to PTO legal determina-
tions tell an interesting story. In 1997, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Chevron did not apply to PTO patent denials.157 Perhaps this demonstrated
acumen: the Supreme Court never held that the sort of informal adjudications
implemented by the PTO—with some elements of formality but clearly falling
short of the requirements of a formal adjudication under sections 556 and
557—would in fact receive Chevron deference. Commentators, and other cir-
cuits, widely believed that Chevron deference applied in such situations, but
maybe they were not as careful as the Federal Circuit.158 The alternative
explanation is that the Federal Circuit was not prescient but lucky: it did not
apply Chevron, as it did not apply the APA, because it mistakenly believed that
ordinary principles of administrative law did not govern its review of the PTO.
On this theory, Zurko disabused the Federal Circuit of that notion, but Mead
allowed it to avoid the strong form of deference delineated in Chevron. We
cannot know, of course, which explanation is the correct one, but the latter
seems more consistent with the Federal Circuit’s actions with respect to other
aspects of administrative law.
The latter explanation is also more consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
behavior regarding PTO legal determinations. Both before and after Zurko, the
Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it grants no deference whatsoever to
PTO legal interpretations. Prior to Zurko, many Federal Circuit cases simply
156. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Calendar Year 2005 Patent Counts, http://www.uspto.gov/go/
taf/st_co_05.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (143,806 utility patents granted in 2005).
157. In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating, without any analysis,
that it would review a patent rejection claim “without deference to the Commissioner’s interpretation”).
The Federal Circuit had held earlier (consistent with Supreme Court precedent) that because the PTO
did not have substantive rulemaking authority, Chevron deference did not apply to PTO regulations. See
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
158. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
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stated flatly that they reviewed PTO legal determinations de novo.159 Zurko did
little to change this pattern: even after Zurko, the Federal Circuit frequently
states that it owes no deference to PTO legal determinations.160 Although the
Federal Circuit does apply Skidmore deference to the actions of other agencies
that it reviews,161 it rarely cites to Skidmore itself (or to Skidmore’s progeny in
the Supreme Court) when it reviews PTO actions. Instead the court relies on its
own pre-Mead cases, which it then construes as providing for no deference
whatsoever.162
Thus far, we have discussed the Federal Circuit’s refusal to apply Skidmore
deference to PTO interpretations of the statute it administers. What about the
PTO’s interpretation of its regulations, which are entitled to very strong defer-
ence under the Supreme Court decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.?163 Before Zurko, the Federal Circuit had similarly stated that it granted no
deference to PTO interpretations of its own regulations. After Zurko, the Federal
Circuit confronted this question again in Dethmers Manufacturing Co. v. Auto-
matic Equipment Manufacturing Co., and the court decided that it would
continue to grant no deference.164 Judge Dyk issued a dissent cogently arguing
that Zurko changed the analysis by reminding the Federal Circuit that ordinary
principles of administrative law applied to its review of the PTO.165 As he noted
159. See, e.g., DH Tech., Inc. v. Synergystex Int’l., Inc., 154 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.”); In re Portola Packaging,
Inc., 110 F.3d at 788 (“Whether the rejection based on the combined teachings of the Faulstich and
Hunter patents was permissible under the reexamination statute raises an issue of statutory interpreta-
tion, a question of law which we review de novo, without deference to the Commissioner’s interpreta-
tion.” (citation omitted)).
160. See, e.g., Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“This court reviews
statutory interpretation, the central issue in this case, without deference.” (citing Merck, 80 F.3d at
1549–50).
161. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 425 F.3d 1381, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding that a United States Customs Service classification was entitled to Skidmore deference);
Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1365–66, 1370–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(discussing the potential application of Skidmore to an International Trade Commission interpretation
and finding that the interpretation was entitled to Skidmore deference); infra note 162.
162. There are two post-Zurko cases in which the Federal Circuit has applied Skidmore deference to
PTO actions. See generally Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 298 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
BlackLight Power, Inc. v. Rogan, 295 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In Bayer, the Federal Circuit stated
that “[t]he district court properly accorded deference to the PTO’s implementing regulations and to the
PTO’s interpretative ‘Decision,’” and cited Skidmore, Merck, and, strikingly, Judge Dyk’s dissent in
Dethmers Manufacturing Co. v. Automatic Equipment Manufacturing Co., 272 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), treating the dissent as if it were the majority. See Bayer, 298 F.3d at 1381. We discuss
Dethmers in the text.
163. 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding that “the ultimate criterion” for judicial construction of an
unclear agency regulation “is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”); see Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines,
Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991) (stating that “the Secretary’s view [of the agency regulation] need only
be reasonable to warrant deference”); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (deferring to the
agency’s “plausible construction of the language of the actual regulation”).
164. 272 F.3d at 1370 (giving no deference to the PTO’s interpretation of its own regulation).
165. Id. at 1378–79 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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in his dissent from the Federal Circuit’s denial of the petition for rehearing en
banc, “[o]ur decision . . . declining to give deference to the PTO interpretation,
is directly inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions concerning other agencies
and with our own decisions concerning other agencies.”166 Strikingly, the
majority’s only response was to rely on its pre-Zurko opinions refusing to
defer.167 For the majority of the Federal Circuit, Zurko apparently changed
fairly little, and the administrative law rules that apply to every other agency
still do not apply to the PTO.
Of course, given the broad language of patent law’s central statutory provi-
sions, many important determinations in patent law will turn on factfinding and
policy rather than law. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s failure to mention
Skidmore deference in its review of PTO decisions, and to adopt de novo review
instead, is important. This is because the court tends to turn facts and policy into
law.168 For example, the court has, in a variety of important cases, reviewed de
novo, as questions of law, technical (and factual) claims about what constitutes
prior art and level of ordinary skill in the art.169 By turning facts into law, and
then ignoring Skidmore, the court is able to avoid deferential review altogether.
As for policy, the Federal Circuit’s position (discussed in the next section) is
that the PTO does not make such determinations. The upshot is that the Federal
Circuit often reviews PTO policy determinations de novo.
3. Policy Decisions and Exercises of Discretion
As we noted above, all agency decisions are divided into a few categories:
findings of fact, legal interpretations, and policy determinations (which include
exercises of discretion). Policy and discretion are sometimes treated separately,
but more often are put together in one category. After all, all policy choices are,
by definition, discretionary choices. The basis for a differentiation between the
two is that some discretionary decisions have the effect of making policy for the
agency, and other decisions are specific determinations whose effect is limited
to the particular case.170 There can be a blurring of the categories at the margins
(if a specific decision is consistently applied in all cases, it may reflect—or
become—agency policy), but we can usually differentiate narrow implementa-
tions from broader, legislative-like policy choices.
166. Dethmers Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 293 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Dyk, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
167. See Dethmers, 272 F.3d at 1370 (relying on pre-Zurko cases).
168. See infra notes 191–201; see also Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, supra note 4, at 1052–65
(reviewing cases).
169. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reviewing de novo, and reversing, the
PTO’s determination that methods routinely used by biotechnologists are appropriate prior art for
claims to gene sequences).
170. See, e.g., GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 6 (1987) (defining “two basic kinds of discretionary authority given to administrative
agencies: (1) authority to make legislative-like policy decisions, and (2) authority to decide how general
policies apply to specific cases”).
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When do policy and discretionary decisions arise? There has probably never
been a statutory scheme that left no room for discretion. An agency that is
directed to issue a particular regulation still has to decide on what date to issue
it.171 To pick an example from a case involving the PTO, a law that permits an
agency to impose sanctions against someone who fails to comply with the
agency’s procedural regulations172 leaves the agency’s decisionmakers with
some discretion to determine whether a particular action constitutes such a
failure.173 Policy decisions are less obviously inevitable. In reality, though,
legislatures generally give agencies room to make their own judgments about
how best to advance Congress’s goals.174 In such situations, the question for a
reviewing court is that of the limits (if any) on the agency’s exercise of its
policymaking authority.
This last point highlights the difference between legal determinations and
policy decisions. Although there is no clear distinction between the two catego-
ries,175 law and policy do tend to fall on opposite sides of a spectrum. Some-
times a statute is ambiguous, and the job of an interpreter (in the first instance,
the administering agency) is to put forward its best reading of the statute. On
other occasions a statute uses terms that are so broad that rules of statutory
construction provide limited guidance and leave the agency with a wide range
of choices. So the agency does not engage in statutory construction but instead
makes value judgments in light of the overall policy goals animating the statute.
Agency actions often incorporate some such policy decisions. For example,
when Congress directs an agency to regulate consistent with the public interest,
convenience, or necessity, it is giving the agency broad policy discretion to
implement those goals.176 Even when a statute is more specific and directs an
171. Even if the agency is directed to issue regulations by a certain date, it still has the discretion to
decide whether to issue them on that date or at some earlier point. We are aware of no statute specifying
the exact date (no later, no earlier) on which a regulation must be issued.
172. The PTO does have authority to issue regulations governing its own procedures. See supra note
149 and accompanying text.
173. See Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reviewing such a determination
by the BPAI for abuse of discretion and finding that the determination was not an abuse).
174. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1676–78, 1711–12 (1975) (noting that there is a “large degree of agency discretion arising
from the inability of Congress . . . to fashion precise directives”).
175. Indeed, some have argued that Chevron deference at step two is defensible precisely on the
grounds that the resolution of legal ambiguities can involve determinations of policy that should be
made by political actors, not courts. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 2086; see also Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 845, 865 (1984) (noting that the EPA had made a “reasonable policy
choice” and that it was “entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices”).
176. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000) (empowering the FCC to regulate consistent with “public
convenience, interest, or necessity”).
This is not to suggest that these statutes impose no limits on the agency. Even broad terms like
“public interest” rule out some agency actions. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S.
662, 671 (1976) (holding that a statutory mandate to advance the “public interest” did not enable the
Federal Power Commission to prohibit employment discrimination by regulated firms because such a
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agency to regulate to protect the public health, the agency still must decide how
to construct a dose-response curve and where to draw the line, consistent with
the public health tradeoffs in doing so.177 In the case of the patent statute, a
number of provisions arguably allow for some policymaking.178 For example,
one of the criteria for patenting in the Patent Act is that an invention be
“useful.”179 But the statute does not explain in any way what “useful” means.
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have long interpreted utility in light of
policy concerns—specifically, concerns that patents on basic research might
hinder cumulative innovation.180 In 2001, in response to concerns that patents
over certain types of upstream genetic information could lead to transaction
cost-heavy patent thickets, the PTO issued guidelines stating that utility should
be given a relatively rigorous interpretation, particularly in cases involving
upstream genetic information.181 In so doing, it was making a policy determina-
tion.
As with findings of fact and legal interpretations, administrative law creates a
scheme for review of agency policy decisions and exercises of discretion. If the
organic statute provides a standard of review, then it controls. Otherwise, the
APA serves as a gap-filler. Specifically, section 706(2)(A) is a catch-all provi-
sion that applies not only to challenges to agency factfinding but also to
challenges to agency policy decisions and exercises of discretion.182
How do the standards of section 706(2)(A) apply in these contexts? For
exercises of discretion, section 706(2)(A) specifically provides for invalidation
regulation was beyond the purposes of the authorizing legislation). But a term like “public interest” is
still quite capacious, and an agency will have many policy options within its ambit.
177. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214–15 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing
the policy determinations entailed in the EPA’s application of a statute authorizing “‘regulation
necessary to protect adequately against . . . risk using the least burdensome requirement’” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) as previously codified)). Note that the current version of this
statute provides: “It is the intent of Congress that the Administrator shall carry out this chapter in a
reasonable and prudent manner, and that the Administrator shall consider the environmental, economic,
and social impact of any action the Administrator takes or proposes to take under this chapter.” 15
U.S.C. § 2601(c) (2000).
178. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, supra note 4, at 1118–19, 1126–27 (discussing provisions
regarding patent scope that could be used in a manner sensitive to the need for follow-on research); see
Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 1580 (discussing patent standards that the authors argue could be
interpreted in a manner sensitive to policy and thus encourage innovation).
179. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
180. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (“Unless and until a process is refined
and developed to this point—where specific benefits exist in currently available form—there is
insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.”).
181. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097–99 (Jan. 5, 2001). See generally
Burk & Lemley, supra note 14 (discussing the use of the utility standard as a policy tool). Although the
PTO guidelines do not specifically state that they apply to upstream genetic information only, the
responses to comments in the guidelines are drawn from this category of information. See Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1092–98.
182. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (“[T]he reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”).
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based on “an abuse of discretion.” The standard that courts of appeals use in
implementing this provision with respect to agency action is very lenient and
very familiar to courts of appeals, because it is the standard that they routinely
use in evaluating discretionary decisions of a lower court.183
Section 706(2)(A) does not include a distinct provision for review of “policy.”
But courts have found that its provision for setting aside actions that are
“arbitrary [or] capricious” is applicable to review of policy decisions.184 How is
the “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard of section 706(2)(A) applied? Under
settled principles of administrative law, the answer is what is known as “hard
look” review.185 Under such review, a court will invalidate an agency action if
the court determines that the agency failed to take a hard look at the significant
considerations against its position.186 If an agency fails to offer an adequate
explanation for its rejection of such countervailing considerations, or promul-
gates a regulation that fails to take into account relevant factors, a court will
invalidate the action.187 Thus, to return to the example above, if a reviewing
court applying ordinary administrative law were to decide that the PTO’s utility
guidelines did not adequately consider arguments that there may be mechanisms
for working around thickets created by patents on upstream information, the
183. Compare Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 278–79
(1987) (applying the abuse of discretion standard under section 706(2)(A) to review an agency’s
decision), with Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–43 (1997) (applying the abuse of discretion
standard to a district court’s decisions to exclude evidence).
184. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (finding that
the “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard of section 706(2)(A) applies to agency policy determinations).
185. See id. (adopting what is known as hard look review); El Conejo Americano of Texas, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Transp., 278 F.3d 17, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying hard look); Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Its supervisory function calls on the court to
intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative
charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals,
that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged
in reasoned decision-making.”).
186. As the Supreme Court elaborated in State Farm,
The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ . . . An agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.
463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). Thus, an
agency’s failure to respond to alternatives to its regulation or arguments that undercut its action is
“arbitrary [or] capricious” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
187. Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296, 305–07 (D.C. Cir. 2004), provides a useful instantiation (and
discussion) of the differences between Chevron and hard look review.
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court might reject the PTO action.188
Just as deference to factual and legal determinations is not complete, so, too,
deference to policy determinations leaves a court with room to reach its own
conclusions about the agency’s handling of the policy decisions. Indeed, of the
three forms of review, hard look review has proved to have the most bite in the
ordinary administrative law context (that is, outside of the world of Federal
Circuit review of the PTO). Invalidations based on faulty factfinding are fairly
uncommon. And when Chevron applies to an agency’s legal interpretation,
courts very rarely invalidate agency action on the grounds that the agency’s
interpretation of an unclear statute was unreasonable.189 Actions entitled to
Skidmore deference receive less deference, but most agencies (though not the
PTO) are entitled to Chevron deference and generally receive such deference for
their key actions (because they are embodied in informal rulemaking). The most
common basis courts invoke to strike down agency actions is that the agency
failed to take a hard look at the arguments for it to act otherwise.190
How does the Federal Circuit treat PTO policy decisions and exercises of
discretion? The court does recognize that the PTO exercises discretion.191
However, with few exceptions, the court has not merely failed to apply the
well-established principles of hard look review to PTO policy decisions. More
fundamentally, in contrast to the court’s treatment of other agencies that it
reviews, it has failed to recognize policy decisions as a separate category of
PTO behavior.192 Rather, it treats PTO decisions as encompassing fact and law,
188. Cf. John Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021, 1021 (2003)
(arguing that researchers are reasonably successful in using various strategies for addressing patent
thickets).
189. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court has rejected an
agency’s legal interpretation at Chevron’s second step on only two occasions).
190. See MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 64 (James E. Alt &
Douglass C. North eds., 1995) (reporting that “most agency decisions are reversed because of
inadequate reasoning from the facts”); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review
of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1265 (1999) (stating that the most common basis for rejecting
agency action is “judicial second-guessing of the policy wisdom of administrative decisions”); Patricia
M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays
On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 234 (1996) (stating that the D.C. Circuit’s most frequent cause for overturning
agency action is that the agency did not give adequate reasons for its policy decisions).
191. See, e.g., Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In that case,
the Federal Circuit identified the relevant question as whether the PTO abused its discretion. Most of its
analysis, however, addressed questions of law (specifically, whether a regulation permitted the PTO to
require submission of certain information, whether the PTO’s interpretation was entitled to substantial
deference, and whether a different regulation allowed a regulated power to refuse the PTO’s request for
information). See id. at 1284. Only at the end of the opinion did the court consider whether the PTO had
abused its discretion. See id. at 1284–85.
192. In its review of PTO decisions, the Federal Circuit rarely cites to the foundational Supreme
Court case on hard look review—State Farm—or refers to its language delineating the sort of review in
which appellate courts are supposed to engage. Interestingly, in the case involving the PTO in which the
Federal Circuit most squarely appears to rely on State Farm (and thus apparently recognizes the
existence of policy decisions), the Federal Circuit applies the doctrine incorrectly. See In re Lee, 277
F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In that case, the Federal Circuit reviewed, and rejected, the PTO’s decision
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or sometimes fact, law, and discretion.193
In a recent case, In re Fisher,194 the Federal Circuit provided a telling
example of the court’s extreme discomfort with a policy category as applied to
PTO decisions. In that case, the court reviewed the PTO’s decision to apply its
2001 utility guidelines in a manner that rejected a patent application for a gene
fragment of unknown function. The Fisher court viewed the PTO’s utility
determination as a simple factual finding that it reviewed for substantial evi-
dence.195 The court was highly dismissive of policy arguments advanced by the
PTO and its supporting amici to the effect that allowing patents on gene
fragments without demonstrated utility would delay scientific progress by creat-
ing patent thickets.196 Ignoring the reality that the Patent Act and administrative
law permit agencies to make policy decisions, the court viewed these arguments
as “public policy considerations which are more appropriately directed to
Congress as the legislative branch of government.”197 Moreover, the court
determined that the PTO’s Utility Guidelines were simply advisory and that
they could “be given judicial notice to the extent they do not conflict with the
statute.”198
Interestingly, the PTO would not have needed to draft utility guidelines
driven by policy concerns if the Federal Circuit had allowed it to conduct its
(through the BPAI) to combine two references to find obviousness. Specifically, the court rejected the
BPAI’s statement that “[t]he conclusion of obviousness may be made from common knowledge and
common sense of a person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a
particular reference.” Id. at 1341 (quoting the BPAI’s opinion in the case). Although the Federal Circuit
did not explicitly state that the BPAI’s statement was a policy decision (indeed, as we discussed above,
see supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text, motivation to combine in any particular case is a
factual question, and the court treated motivation partly in that way), the court did invoke State Farm.
See id. at 1344 (citing State Farm for the proposition that an agency must have an evidentiary basis for
its findings—even under deferential review). But to the extent that the Lee court invoked hard look to
reject reliance on common sense, its decision squarely contradicts the well-settled doctrine of official
notice. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Also striking is the fact that the Federal Circuit has straightforwardly applied State Farm in
reviewing agencies other than the PTO. See, e.g., Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying State Farm to a policy decision made by the International Trade
Commission).
193. See, e.g., In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Our review of a decision of the
Board is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under that statutory provision,
we will set aside legal actions of the Board that are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law,’ and set aside factual findings that are ‘unsupported by
substantial evidence.’” (citations omitted)); In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(relying on identical language). Note that the quotation uses the odd phrase “legal actions.” We assume
that “legal action[]” means “legal interpretation,” as that sets up the parallelism with “factual findings”
in the same sentence; if so, then the courts are, indeed, talking only about legal interpretations and
factual findings. If, however, “legal action” means “final agency action” as that term is used in
administrative law, then “legal action” might encompass policy decisions as well as discretionary
actions.
194. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
195. Id. at 1369.
196. See id. at 1378.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1372 (citing prior Federal Circuit cases).
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ordinary, nonobviousness-related factfinding. As Judge Rader pointed out in his
Fisher dissent, the utility guidelines arose in large part because Federal Circuit
cases in the area of genetic information have disabled the PTO.199 Specifically,
the Federal Circuit has overturned PTO determinations that routine methods for
generating genetic information constitute relevant prior art.200 Judge Rader’s
dissent underscores a point we made earlier—that, done properly, the type of
technical factfinding required by the patent statute often serves economic policy
goals reasonably well.201
Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that there will be some situations where
technical standards will not comport with considerations of economic policy.
For example, given the rapid advance of biotechnology, it might be technically
obvious to identify a gene that could be used therapeutically. In this case, a
patent right might be useful for development purposes—without a patent no one
would have the incentive to develop the potential therapeutic product through
the expensive clinical trial process. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s decision
essentially to eliminate the nonobviousness standard in the area of gene sequenc-
ing (by stating that methods do not count as prior art for gene sequence patents)
could be rationalized as a response to the fear of such a scenario.202 The
problem with the Federal Circuit’s approach is that it does not, and cannot,
distinguish between situations in which elimination of the nonobviousness
standard is likely to create patent thickets and those in which such elimination
may be useful for promoting drug development. Moreover, as a matter of patent
doctrine, the Federal Circuit’s approach to nonobviousness leads inexorably to
the conclusion that such patents must be unusually narrow.203 Consequently, in
the therapeutic context, the Federal Circuit’s approach would not provide the
sort of protection necessary for further clinical development.204 Only explicit
consideration of policy allows for distinctions that provide the requisite level of
protection at the appropriate stage of research.
Some commentators have argued that the nonobviousness requirement—and
particularly the doctrine of secondary considerations—could be expanded to
199. Id. at 1382 (asserting that “this court has deprived the Patent Office of the obviousness
requirement for genomic inventions”).
200. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557–59 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
201. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
202. Although they do not use this particular example, some commentators have argued that the
Federal Circuit decision effectively to eliminate the obviousness standard in the area of gene sequenc-
ing may have been a sub rosa attempt to incorporate economic considerations. See, e.g., Karen I. Boyd,
Nonobviousness and the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic Nonobvious-
ness, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 337–43 (1997); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 14.
203. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(noting that “[i]n claims involving chemical materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specific-
ity what the generic claims encompass”). A full discussion of the reasons for this link between a low
nonobviousness standard and narrow patent scope is beyond the purview of this Article. Briefly,
however, when the nonobviousness standard is low because the field is purportedly uncertain or risky,
the scope of the inventive terrain the patent applicant can claim will be correspondingly narrow.
204. See Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, supra note 4, at 1072–73.
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take explicit account of economic policy arguments.205 As we discussed earlier,
the current secondary considerations doctrine aims to assist with the inquiry into
technical nonobviousness set out in the statute.206 Thus this doctrine is best seen
as a legal interpretation of the statute. An economic nonobviousness criterion,
by contrast, would be driven entirely by policy—it would have no clear
statutory hook. But the language of the nonobviousness requirement is arguably
sufficiently capacious to allow for an economic nonobviousness criterion driven
entirely by policy. Thus, for example, if the PTO were faced with a grant
application on a therapeutic gene that was technically obvious, it could deter-
mine, as a matter of policy, that the patent was necessary to promote develop-
ment. As many commentators have noted, the cost and risk associated with
taking a therapy through the clinical trials mandated by the Food and Drug
Administration is substantial.207 The PTO might also point out that such a
patent grant would be unlikely to lead to patent thickets. Indeed, one of the
reasons that the patent would be necessary in the first instance was that the
likelihood of additional downstream patents was small. The Federal Circuit
would (or should) then review the PTO’s policy determination using the “hard
look” approach—did the PTO (ideally assisted by economic advisors) consider
all of the economic arguments for and against the need for such a patent?
III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The prior two Parts have discussed the existing structure for judicial review
of PTO decisionmaking (or at least what, as a matter of formal legal analysis,
such judicial review should look like). The discussion so far thus answers the
descriptive question of how existing administrative principles apply to the
Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO. That answer is sufficient to guide courts
and is valuable in its own right, but it does not answer the normative question of
how we would want the relationship between courts (particularly the Federal
Circuit) and the PTO to be structured. In this section, we turn to normative
concerns. In keeping with our discussion in Part I, our normative baseline is
innovation. Thus we ask what type of judicial review is most likely to promote
innovation.208
205. See generally Merges, supra note 32.
206. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003).
208. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 48–59 (1991) (arguing for the importance of a normative baseline in institutional
analysis). Because of our normative baseline, we focus here on functional normative considerations—
for example, tradeoffs between expertise and capture as well as values of deliberation and accountabil-
ity—as contrasted with formal structural considerations (e.g., a formal perspective on separation of
powers). It bears mentioning, however, that some concerns about how administrative law doctrine,
particularly the Chevron doctrine, may contravene formal constitutional values are arguably addressed
by cases like Mead, which attempt to limit the domain of Chevron to situations where it would appear
that Congress has “delegated” authority to make law to the administrative agency.
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This entails a comparative analysis of the PTO and the Federal Circuit. After
all, the question is what role we want each institution to play—and that is a
comparative question between institutions. If we conclude, for example, that
both agencies and courts do a good (or bad) job of making some set of
decisions, that still leaves us with the question of how much authority we want
each to have relative to the other. In what follows, we address this question
through a pragmatic lens. There is an allure to concocting a deus ex machina—in
this case, an ideal court (or courts) and agency—but that would elide the harder
task of making comparative institutional choices among realistic alternatives.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW GENERALLY
A fair amount has been written on the broad topic of comparative institutional
analysis, providing a foundation for consideration of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of administrative agencies and federal courts.209 In broad outline,
agencies generally have an advantage over courts in terms of institutional
competence. One of the central rationales for creating administrative agencies
was that they would have greater expertise and focus than generalist legislatures
or courts.210 The idea was to create expert agencies that would concentrate on a
particular area, and thereby bring technocratic rigor to the decisionmaking
process.211 Even if the head (or heads) of an agency is not an expert, agencies
usually have large staffs and significant research capabilities. And the agencies
can request information from third parties (for example, think tanks and aca-
demic societies) to supplement their internal expertise. In contrast, courts have
modest staffs, and the vast majority of the information judges receive is from
209. A major recent commentator on comparative institutional analysis is Neil Komesar. See NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1994). His work does not focus on administrative agencies, but he includes them among the
institutions he considers. Others have focused more specifically on legislatures versus courts. See
generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); HENRY M. HART JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL
POLICY 22–67 (1977); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99
MICH. L. REV. 281, 332–43 (1999); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches, 83 GEO.
L.J. 347 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (2003).
210. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 621 (1927)
(“[T]he inquirer [into administrative law] must have a sympathetic understanding of the major causes
which led to the emergence of modern administrative law, and must be able to move freely in the world
of social and economic facts with which administrative law is largely concerned.”).
211. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6–46 (Greenwood Press 1974) (1938)
(discussing the ideas behind the development of the administrative state in the United States); Louis L.
Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1964); Sunstein, supra note
126, at 2079 (1990) (“For the twentieth century reformers, courts lacked the flexibility, powers of
coordination, initiative, democratic accountability, and expertise necessary to deal with complex social
problems.”).
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self-selected interested parties.212 As one of us has previously noted, “Judges
can seek information from disinterested parties, but such procedures are ad hoc
and, in part for that reason, fairly cumbersome.”213 Agencies thus generally
have a greater ability than courts to amass expertise and make decisions on
complex, data-intensive matters.214
The advantages in competence that flow from specialization may have other
drawbacks, however. The agency might be so narrowly focused that it develops
tunnel vision—that is, it focuses on benefiting its own sector of the economy
even though the costs imposed on society more broadly may outweigh those
benefits.215 More disturbingly, it may be biased, as a result of capture by narrow
interests. This latter concern flows in significant part from the logic of collective
action:216 small groups of players with concentrated interests will have an easier
time organizing, and influencing, decisionmakers than will large, diffuse groups.
Concentrated costs (or benefits) make for more effective action than do diffuse
costs (or benefits).217
This concern about capture is not limited to agencies, however. Although
many early capture theorists saw agencies as particularly prone to capture by
narrow interests, the rise of public choice theory—which assumes that all
government actors maximize, at least in part, private goals to which narrow
interests can cater—extends concerns about the power of narrow interests to all
government actors.218 The idea is that powerful interests will do a good job of
supplying whatever it is that government actors seek (for example, incumbency
protection in the case of representatives), and so we would expect those
interests to prevail in whatever forum they appear. On this theory, all govern-
ment actors—including courts—will be subject to capture, at least to some
212. See Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence, 48 HARV. L. REV.
169, 180–81 (1934); Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10–17 (1987).
213. See Benjamin, supra note 209, at 333–34.
214. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972–75
(1992) (“[C]ourts are generalists, whereas agencies are specialists. Specialists usually have a better
grasp of technical terms or the practical consequences of a decision, and thus their views should be
given deference by generalists.”).
215. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
11 (3d prtg. 1994) (“Tunnel vision, a classic administrative disease, arises when an agency so organizes
or subdivides its tasks that each employee’s individual conscientious performance effectively carries
single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point where it brings about more harm than
good.”).
216. The phrase comes from the book of the same title. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
217. Id. at 53–57, 132–34.
218. Some suggest that public actors are motivated solely (or at least very heavily) by their private
interests. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 455, 456–58 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); Roger G. Noll, Economic
Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253, 1262–63
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
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As the work of Neil Komesar among others illustrates, concerns about
government actors being captured by narrow interests are not limited to those
who accept the motivational presuppositions of public choice.220 Even for those
who are agnostic about motivation, or believe that government actors pursue
public-regarding objectives,221 capture by narrow interests seems a plausible
account of the result that will occur if these interests are the most vigorous
participants in the processes of governance. In the case of courts, this translates
into the unexceptional proposition, long noted in the legal literature, that those
repeat players with the strongest interest in the precedential or preclusive effects
of a case will have a significant advantage in judicial proceedings.222
But just as the degree of competence is a comparative one between courts and
agencies, so too is the likelihood of bias (in the form of capture). Saying that
courts may be subject to capture does not mean that the danger of capture is as
great for courts as it is for agencies. Although a few commentators have
suggested that courts are more easily controlled by factions than are agen-
cies,223 the more widely held view is that courts are less likely to be captured.224
This conclusion flows in significant part from the facts that agencies usually
have a somewhat narrow focus; that agency officials often come from, and plan
to return to, the industry that they regulate; and that powerful interest groups
can help to provide agency members with benefits that they prize (budgetary
clout on Capitol Hill and future employment are the two most often cited).225
By contrast, judges have life tenure and thus less concern about their future
employment, have salaries and budgets that are largely free from congressional
219. See Noll, supra note 218, at 1263.
220. See KOMESAR, supra note 209, at 54–58, 172–73, 192.
221. See Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Foreword: Post-Public Choice?, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 267, 268–70 (2002) (noting that behavioral research portrays people as less self-centered than
public choice suggests); cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of
Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 146 (1989) (noting that critics of public choice have shown only
that ideology plays some role in legislative behavior; critics “merely limit[] the appropriate claims that
can be made for an economic theory of politics”).
222. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974) (stating that “repeat players” have advantages that
give them a greater chance of success than “one-shotters”); Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey
Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of
Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 242 (1996).
223. See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1243, 1323 (1999) (suggesting that agencies are less likely to be controlled by factions because
they are guided by the President, and “the President’s broad and heterogeneous constituency renders the
Executive relatively less vulnerable and creates greater concern for the broad public interest”).
224. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 129
(1983) (suggesting that judges tend to seek to maximize their prestige among litigants and thus are less
subject to capture). See generally KOMESAR, supra note 209, at 10 (arguing that the courts have some
comparative advantages when compared to other institutions).
225. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 114 (1971)
(“[T]he coterminous relation of a bureaucrat’s rewards and his position implies that bureaucrat will
maximize the total budget of his bureau . . . .”).
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meddling, and may have a greater desire for prestige (which powerful interest
groups cannot easily provide).226 It thus seems that, as a comparative matter,
agencies have greater competence but are more likely to be subject to the
blandishments of well-funded interest groups. This is not a huge surprise, of
course. The theory of capture grew out of studies of agency behavior in the first
place.227
What does this suggest for administrative law? The standard answer is that
courts should give great deference to agencies’ findings of fact and less defer-
ence to their legal interpretations and policy determinations. As to facts, the idea
is that accurate factfinding in complex areas requires specialized knowledge and
intimate familiarity with the underlying circumstances, so competence looms
particularly large.228 The advantage that courts have in terms of capture is
outweighed by their difficulty in sifting through complicated technical informa-
tion. The possibility of an agency’s bias affecting its factfinding suggests that
deference should not be complete, but the agency’s great advantage in compe-
tence suggests that deference should be very great.
As contrasted with agency factfinding, an agency’s legal interpretations and
its policy decisions are not as dependent on the understanding of technical data.
Accordingly, they can be more effectively reviewed by courts. In addition, legal
and policy determinations that sweep broadly are likely to be the subject of the
most intensive lobbying and thus may be the determinations we most want to
insulate from the possibility of capture. These considerations suggest less
judicial deference for agencies’ legal and policy determinations than for their
findings of fact.
The deference scheme suggested by this comparative institutional analysis is
close to the system we have. As we discussed earlier, courts give very great
deference to agency factfinding and less deference to policy decisions and many
legal determinations.229 An exception to this general conformity with compara-
tive institutional analysis is Chevron deference.230 As cabined by Mead, how-
ever, Chevron deference clearly applies to legal interpretations made in informal
rulemakings or formal adjudications.231 Although commentators have fairly
criticized this emphasis on procedure as perhaps contributing unduly to ossifica-
226. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 530–31 (6th ed. 2003) (noting the value of
judges’ “aloof disinterest” in the outcome of cases). This does not necessarily mean that judges are
insulated from their private interests. Rather, it means that their private interests may more closely
comport with public interests. Assuming, for example, that their private interest is in their reputation
and esteem among their colleagues and litigants, those interests might be fairly closely aligned with the
public interest.
227. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79–87 (Green-
wood Press 1977) (1955).
228. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 209, at 332–35.
229. See supra Part II.B.
230. See supra Part II.B.2.
231. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); supra notes 136–39 and
accompanying text (indicating that a significant level of procedural formality is sufficient, if not always
necessary).
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tion,232 procedure can sometimes provide a defense against capture and promote
normative values of deliberation and accountability. For example, the trial-type
context of formal adjudications, with the parties presenting evidence and rebut-
ting their opponents’ evidence and with the hearing officer’s decision based
solely on the material presented at the hearing, alleviates the fear of powerful
interests presenting arguments privately to the decisionmaker and more gener-
ally reduces concerns about bias affecting the agency’s decision.233 Informal
rulemaking, by contrast, allows for precisely this sort of private communication.
Because the agency’s decision need not be based on the record, the result has
been that the most important decisions are made by the agency outside of the
routinized comment process—all of which raises serious concerns about the
influence of powerful interest groups.234 In sum, with the significant exception
of deference to legal determinations in the context of informal rulemaking, the
current regime is close to the one suggested by normative considerations.235
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE EXISTING PATENT SYSTEM
The PTO does not engage in informal rulemaking, so the exception noted
immediately above is not an issue. But that still leaves the larger question: Does
this comparative institutional analysis play out differently in the specific context
of the Federal Circuit and the PTO? The short answer is a qualified “yes.” Is the
Federal Circuit’s specialization, and the PTO’s relative weakness, sufficiently
anomalous that the PTO should be subject to a special deference regime? The
short answer is, quite emphatically, “no.” Although there might be reasons for
the relationship between the PTO and the courts to diverge somewhat from the
traditional agency/court relationship, there is no reason for major departures. In
what follows, we consider what judicial review of the PTO should look like.
We begin with law and policy. The repeated exposure of Federal Circuit
judges to appeals from the PTO—and appeals in patent cases more generally—
232. Barron & Kagan, supra note 56, at 204 (discussing costs of APA procedures).
233. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1375–91 (finding that the rules and structure
of formal adjudication tend to reduce bias, whereas informality tends to increase it).
234. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political
Institutions, Thirty-Fifth Administrative Law Issue, 55 DUKE L.J. 893 (2006); E. Donald Elliott,
Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992) (“Notice and comment rulemaking is to
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for
displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues.”).
235. For present purposes, we do not need to address the problem of whether, over the broad range
of administrative decisionmaking, the approach set out by Mead will be too difficult for courts to apply.
With the possible exception of patent denials, see supra p. 299, the domain of Chevron in the patent
context is quite clear. Moreover, although many commentators have argued that the standard set out by
Mead is too difficult for lower courts to apply, and that a brightline rule might be preferable, see, e.g.,
Merrill, supra note 133, at 808–09 (arguing for a “meta-rule”); Sunstein, supra note 133, at 194
(asserting that Chevron deference can be applied in “much simpler and better ways”); Vermeule, supra
note 133, at 347 (criticizing the “increasing complexity” caused by Mead), Mead does attempt to
mediate the long-standing debate over the relative attractiveness of rules versus standards by adopting a
rule that procedural rigor is sufficient.
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means that they have greater familiarity with the underlying statutory regime
and the PTO’s implementation of its authority under that regime than a general-
ist judge would with a typical agency that she reviews. As a result, Federal
Circuit judges probably have greater-than-average expertise with respect to the
PTO’s legal interpretations and policy decisions.
However, concerns about bias and tunnel vision are also quite salient in the
context of legal and policy determinations. Because of specialization, the
possibility of bias is greater for the Federal Circuit than for the regional United
States Courts of Appeals. Just as agencies can suffer from bias, so too can
specialized courts.236 In particular, unlike generalist courts of appeals, the
Federal Circuit is closely connected with a particular bar, the patent bar.
Although the patent bar has members who represent both plaintiffs and defen-
dants in patent cases, patent lawyers generally have an interest in a patent
system that is relatively robust.237 Thus, the Federal Circuit is not likely to hear
many arguments that raise fundamental legal and policy questions about the
system. Notably, various empirical studies indicate that the Federal Circuit is
substantially less likely to find patents invalid than its predecessor regional
courts of appeals.238 While this is hardly definitive evidence of capture—the
regional courts of appeals may well have been too demanding in their validity
standards, and some empirical studies also suggest that the Federal Circuit may
be more likely than its predecessors to read patents narrowly and hence find
them not infringed239—it is suggestive of capture.
This is not to suggest that the PTO is unbiased. To the contrary, the problem
of capture arises with respect to the PTO as well. It is favorably disposed to
patent holders. Not only is the incentive system of individual examiners strongly
tilted towards granting patents, but the agency as a whole is funded by applicant
fees.240
The point is simply that just as expertise is relative, so too is bias. In this
236. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1146, 1153 (1990) (arguing that specialized courts tend to control administra-
tive action less effectively than generalist courts); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1989) (noting that specialized judges may
be susceptible to capture).
237. See generally ADAM JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2004) (noting that
the proliferation of patents has led to a proliferation of patent litigation, rendering lawyers the “key
players” in patent struggles).
238. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–06 (1998); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85 (2006); Glynn S.
Lunney, E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 365 (2001); Glynn S. Lunney, Patent
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1–2
(2004).
239. Lunney, supra note 238; Henry & Turner, supra note 238.
240. See infra notes 247–53 and accompanying text (discussing the PTO’s incentives to grant
patents); Joseph Scott Miller, This Bitter Has Some Sweet: Potential Antitrust Enforcement Benefits
From Patent Law’s Procedural Rules, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 875, 893 n.48 (2003) (noting that the sole
funding source for the PTO is applicant fees).
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case, it appears that having a specialized court that reviews PTO decisions has
produced in the Federal Circuit—relative to the regional courts of appeals—
both greater bias and greater expertise about the statutory scheme and PTO
processes.
So how, if at all, should the Federal Circuit’s somewhat greater bias, and
somewhat greater expertise, about legal and policy determinations change the
deference calculus outlined in the previous section? The problem with answer-
ing that question is that expertise and capture pull in opposite directions, and it
is difficult to determine whether one outweighs the other. What seems clear,
though, is that the change from the deference template discussed in Part III.A
would be fairly small. That is, given that bias and expertise counteract one
another, it seems unlikely that either would be so much greater than the other
that it would change significantly the normatively attractive standard of re-
view.241
What about factfinding? As we discussed above, the expertise factor is most
important in the area of factfinding. In the context of nonobviousness, for
example, expertise is necessary not only for purposes of applying the so-called
Graham considerations (for example, the relationship of the invention to the
prior art and the ordinary skill in the field),242 but it also may be important in
guarding against hindsight bias.243 The judges of the Federal Circuit are cer-
tainly more steeped in patent jurisprudence than generalist judges, and the
Federal Circuit does have a small technical staff. But it is not clear that Federal
Circuit judges know more about any given technology than a generalist judge
would. The specialization required to understand the underlying technologies is
so great that a background in patent law—or even a general science background—
will provide little advantage when a judge is dealing with factual findings on a
complex technological matter.244 Thus, the few Federal Circuit judges with
technical training likely will find that training relevant in relatively few cases
(and the Federal Circuit judges without such training will not have even that
modest benefit).245
241. We discuss the desirability of very small changes to the level of deference in Part IV.C.
242. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
243. See Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias
Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing, based on experi-
ment with law students, that hindsight bias is pervasive, but noting studies indicating that it may be less
pervasive among experts).
244. See Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, supra note 4, at 1069 (“[B]ecause scientific knowledge is
highly localized, training in one area of science or technology simply does not transfer into other
areas.”); see also Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 763, 766 (2002). Technical training may be particularly relevant to factfinding in patent law
because there is reason to believe that individuals with technical training may be less likely than
laypersons to suffer from hindsight bias in their determinations of whether an invention is obvious. See
Mandel, supra note 243.
245. Judges Linn, Gajarsa, Newman, and Lourie have technical backgrounds. See U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies, http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2006).
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Moreover, even if Federal Circuit judges did, on average, have more factfind-
ing expertise than generalist judges, that expertise still pales in comparison to
that of the PTO. In contrast to the judges’ limited technical backgrounds and
small staffs, the PTO has thousands of patent examiners with training in
multiple different fields of technology. Any increase in expertise of the Federal
Circuit over a generalist court is so marginal, in light of the greater resources of
the PTO, that such specialization should make little, if any, difference in the
deference accorded to the PTO on factfinding.246
There is a different consideration, though, that suggests a bigger relative
change from the generic deference template outlined above—the context for
PTO patent denials versus patent grants.247 The current structure of patent
examination makes PTO denials sufficiently difficult that there is strong reason
to believe that false positives (patent grants that should be denials) are much
more common than false negatives (denials that should be grants). Under the
patent statute, the patent examiner has the burden of demonstrating lack of
patentability.248 Moreover, because of the severe resource constraints under
which the patent office operates, the examiner must typically meet this burden
in about eighteen hours.249 The nature of patent procedure also militates in
favor of patent grants. Specifically, because an applicant can always file a
continuation application if her initial application is denied, there need be no
such thing as a “final” rejection of an application. Determined applicants can
“wear down” the examiner through the filing of multiple continuations.250 Most
importantly, a patent denial diverges from a patent grant in that it goes through
significant appellate review even before it reaches the Federal Circuit. Such
review is conducted by three-judge panels of the BPAI. Notably, review by
BPAI judges, who are familiar with the relevant law and frequently have some
skill in the relevant science, is far from a rubber stamp for examiner denials. To
the contrary, in fiscal year 2004, the BPAI affirmed examiner denials in only
246. And, as we discuss in Part IV.C, those small changes are likely not worth the trouble.
247. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How
Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs Of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 76 (2006) (“The
Patent Office has an incentive to grant patents without being unduly concerned about the quality of its
examination process.”).
248. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (stating that “[a] person shall be entitled to a
patent unless” the examiner shows that she has failed to meet certain requirements of patentability).
249. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 1500 (stating that a patent examiner spends an average of
eighteen hours on a patent application); see also FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 5 (giving estimates
of the total amount of time available to examine a patent application that range from eight to
twenty-five hours).
250. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 63, 75 (2004) (stating that “an examiner faced with a determined applicant has every incentive to
give in and allow the patent”). Of course, to the extent that continuation proceedings were curtailed
considerably (as is the current PTO plan), this argument would no longer militate in favor of accuracy
in patent denial. Even with reform of continuations, however, the other arguments in the text supporting
accuracy of patent denials would still counsel in favor of significant deference.
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37.1% of cases.251 Moreover, even those denials that were actually reviewed by
the BPAI represent only a very select subset of all patent denials. In fiscal year
2003, examiners from most technology classes reopened the case, or simply
allowed the application, more than 50% of the time after an appeal brief to the
BPAI had been filed.252
The flip side of the costs of denial is that decisions to grant patents should be
subject to less deference. That is, the greater likelihood of false positives than false
negatives counsels courts to treat grants more warily than would an ordinary court
reviewing an ordinary agency. The disincentives for PTO patent denials are suffi-
ciently great that bifurcated, or asymmetric, review would be attractive—with patent
denials subject to more deference than patent grants.253
IV. BRINGING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINE AND NORMATIVELY ATTRACTIVE
STANDARDS TOGETHER
A comparative institutional analysis of the Federal Circuit and the PTO
suggests that a normatively attractive level of deference could differ in certain
ways from the deference provided by administrative law doctrine. Thus, the last
remaining questions are how (if at all) the normatively attractive answer might
converge with the doctrine, and whether such convergence is worth the trouble.
A. STATUTORY OR JUDICIAL ALTERATION OF THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The most straightforward and safest way to create particular levels of defer-
ence is for Congress to change the statutory scheme. The degree of deference
courts should accord to agency decisions is subject to congressional control, and
Congress can exercise this control by specifying the standards of review that the
Federal Circuit should apply when considering various kinds of PTO actions.
The APA, after all, is just a set of default rules, and agencies’ organic acts often
251. See United States Patent & Trademark Office, Fiscal Year 2004, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/dcom/bpai/docs/receipts/fy2004.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (showing that 37.1% of denials
were affirmed by the BPAI).
252. In total, 59.4% of appeals resulted in either allowance or reopening of the case. Examiner
Actions after Submission of Appeal Brief (on file with authors). In Part IV, we discuss trends in BPAI
reversals and appeals to the BPAI as a function of changing standards of review by the Federal Circuit.
253. One might favor a policy of deference to PTO factfinding in an ordinary patent denial but
nonetheless ask whether such a policy will have much impact. After all, only about 1% of patent
dispositions ultimately get appealed to the BPAI. Approximately 1% of BPAI dispositions then get
appealed to the Federal Circuit. Interview with James Toupin, USPTO General Counsel (Oct. 13, 2004)
(on file with authors). The small numbers notwithstanding, direct appeals from the BPAI to the Federal
Circuit appear to be the cases that are most “visible” to patent examiners, as well as to the higher level
PTO administration. Unlike appeals from district court litigation, which tend to be decided many years
after the original patent decision, appeals from the BPAI are decided soon after the patent decision is
made. Indeed, they may be decided within the tenure of the average patent examiner. Additionally,
these appeals represent the most direct evaluation of the PTO. By contrast, in cases appealed from
district courts, the factfinding that is at issue is generally that of the district court. And our review of the
cases emphasized by the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure fortifies the argument that the PTO
pays disproportionate attention to direct appeals.
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contain their own specific rules that govern.254 So Congress could amend the
Patent Act to create whatever particular rules for review of the PTO that it
desired.
In fact, the statutory tweaks could be fairly minor. The default APA-level
deference for PTO factfinding mandated by Dickinson v. Zurko, if applied
properly by the Federal Circuit, would work well as a normative matter for
patent denials. As for deference on questions of law, the analysis in Mead
suggests that Chevron may be the appropriate standard for patent denials.255
Under Chevron, the PTO’s patent denial would receive substantial deference—it
would be upheld if reasonable. But even if Skidmore were the appropriate
standard, a normatively attractive result likely would occur. Skidmore explicitly
provides for a sliding scale of deference. As we noted above, ordinary patent
denials occur only after significant and careful agency internal review.256 This is
important under Skidmore, which looks first to “the thoroughness evident in [the
agency’s] consideration” in determining how much deference to grant to the
agency’s decision.257 As Mead elaborated, under Skidmore courts look to “the
degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness,
and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”258 The level of care and
thoroughness entailed in patent denials is considerable (as is the PTO’s relative
expertness).259 As a result, Skidmore suggests a fair amount of deference to
agency legal determinations made in the course of such denials—and less
deference in the context of patent grants, which do not entail significant internal
review. As for policy determinations, a “hard look” approach would favor patent
denials over patent grants. To the extent the PTO engages in economic reason-
ing, it is much more likely to do so comprehensively in the context of the fairly
extensive procedures involved in patent denials than in its routine patent grants.
Only the level of deference accorded to factfinding in patent grants would
have to be altered. Indeed, the FTC report specifically argued that the factfind-
ing in ordinary patent grants should be subject to being overturned under a
relatively low-threshold “preponderance of the evidence” standard.260
A legislative reduction of the evidentiary burden for patent invalidation is a
straightforward solution. But current patent reform bills in Congress do not so propose
(at least outside the context of post-grant review discussed below). Absent statutory
change, could the Federal Circuit (if it were so inclined) adopt the analysis of this
254. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
255. See supra p. 299.
256. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text and p. 299.
257. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight [accorded to an
administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (quoting this language).
258. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
259. See supra notes 247–52 and accompanying text.
260. FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 28.
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Article and announce that, henceforth, it would increase or decrease the deference it
accorded to PTO actions (or instructed lower courts to accord to PTO actions) based
on normative considerations of comparative institutional analysis? As we have dis-
cussed in this Article, the Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO should be guided by
administrative law doctrine. One of the central points of our Article, and of Dickinson
v. Zurko, is that ordinary rules of administrative law apply to the Federal Circuit and
the PTO.261 So the real question is whether, as a matter of administrative law doctrine,
a court can take into account considerations of institutional analysis in deciding what
standards of review to apply.
Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court has explicitly stated that
courts should calibrate the level of deference to agency factfinding based on an
agency’s likelihood of capture or the thoroughness of its evaluation.262 But
there is some judicial support for the proposition that courts take into account an
agency’s expertise and the structure of an agency’s processes in determining
how much deference is owed to a particular decision. Interestingly, the clearest
such statement from the Supreme Court appears in Dickinson v. Zurko itself.
There the Court noted the “importance of case-specific factors, such as a
finding’s dependence upon agency expertise or the presence of internal agency
review, which factors will often prove more influential in respect to outcome
than will the applicable standard of review.”263 Given the structure of PTO
incentives, factfinding in denials is much more likely to take advantage of PTO
expertise than is factfinding in grants.264 Moreover, unlike a grant, a denial goes
through precisely the type of internal agency review to which the Zurko Court
refers. Thus, if the Zurko language were taken seriously, that would mean that
judicial deference to PTO factfinding would be asymmetric: factfinding in
patent denials would be given more deference than factfinding in patent grants.
There is another quite practical reason that proper application of administra-
tive law principles would entail substantially greater overall deference to factfind-
ing in patent denials than in patent grants. The empirical literature suggests that
when patent grants are challenged in litigation, it is often at least in part on the
basis of prior art that the PTO never reviewed.265 Under boilerplate administra-
tive law, a court cannot defer to agency factfinding if the agency has not even
passed on the factual question—the agency has not considered the factual
question, so there is nothing for the court to defer to. In contrast, when a patent
applicant appeals a patent denial, the appeal is unlikely to introduce new prior
art. Instead, like appellate decisionmakers generally, the Federal Circuit decides
261. 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999).
262. Some commentators have argued in favor of a similar approach. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro,
Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U.
KAN. L. REV. 689, 746 (2000) (arguing in favor of judicial “[p]ragmatism”).
263. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 163.
264. See supra notes 247–53 and accompanying text.
265. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 238, at 231.
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the case on the basis of the factual record put forward by the PTO.266
B. COMBINING NEW PROCEDURES WITH EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES
As we noted at the outset of this Article, our aim is not to describe the relationship
between an idealized court and agency. But we do want to consider realistic changes.
We noted in the previous section that judicial application of existing administrative
law principles, without any action by Congress, could bring review of PTO decisions
closer to a normatively attractive position. As we also noted above, Congress could
pass legislation specifying normatively attractive standards of review. Another impor-
tant possibility would be for Congress to create new PTO procedures and then either
specify the review applicable to those procedures or, more simply, let the application
of existing administrative law principles complete the move to more normatively
attractive standards of review.
1. Post-Grant Review and Deference
There are two modest changes to PTO procedures that fit the bill. The first is
post-grant opposition proceedings. As various commentators have noted, such
proceedings have been used successfully in most patent offices outside the U.S.
and would probably improve patent quality.267 What others have failed to
recognize, however, is that the collective action problem that might chill use of
such proceedings can be mitigated through the application of existing administra-
tive law doctrines. Indeed, only through administrative review can these proceed-
ings approximate the advantages of the European system of post-grant review.
a. Cost-Effective Post-Grant Review. We noted earlier in this Article the
widespread belief that the large number of poor quality patents currently being
issued by the PTO is imposing substantial costs.268 There is some uncertainty
about the extent of such costs, but most commentators believe that they are
considerable, at least with respect to patents that are economically signifi-
cant.269 Thus, despite some uncertainty about the costs, many commentators
(including the Federal Trade Commission, the National Academy of Sciences,
266. The Federal Circuit does, however, sometimes step out of its appellate role and supplement the
PTO record. See William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal
Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 739–47 (2000) (discussing
cases in which the Federal Circuit appeared to supplement the factual record).
267. See infra notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
268. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 1–4 (finding that poor quality patents that are
nonetheless commercially significant slow innovation by discouraging firms from conducting research,
necessitate unnecessary licenses and royalty payments, and impose unnecessary litigation costs in
challenges to their validity); Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 38, at 227–34 (discussing social costs of bad
patents); Kesan & Gallo, supra note 247, at 87–90 (discussing litigation costs of bad patents); Kristen
Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in
the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 126–27 (2005) (presenting costs of poor quality patents).
269. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 3, at 22 (noting that patent litigation can cost between five
and seven million dollars and take years to litigate); Allison & Lemley, supra note 238, at 187
(discussing exceptionally high costs of patent litigation).
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and the American Intellectual Property Law Association) have argued in favor
of the cost-effectiveness of post-grant opposition proceedings—that is, trial-
type proceedings before an administrative patent judge where competitors of the
patentee could bring prior art to bear, other types of written and oral evidence
could be taken, and the administrative judge would make a decision based on
the evidence presented.270 Like ordinary patent denials, denials in post-grant
review would be subject to immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit. Absent
such appeal, or if the patent denial was upheld on appeal, the patent would be
taken out of the system.
To the extent that post-grant opposition proceedings are used on a regular basis to
target those patents that are economically important (and evidence from the European
experience suggests that post-grant review indeed targets such patents),271 such
opposition proceedings are likely to be cost-effective.272 More specifically, post-grant
review proceedings could be valuable if two conditions obtain: (1) these proceedings
are actually used on a reasonably regular basis; and (2) the proceedings thereby
address the deleterious consequences imposed by patents of uncertain validity, such as
the need for expensive litigation before a trial court decisionmaker (a lay judge and
jury) of questionable competence, unnecessary licensing, wasteful “inventing around,”
chilling effects, and races to accumulate defensive portfolios.
The most readily quantifiable of these costs is the actual out-of-pocket
expense of litigation. The obvious category of cases where litigation will be
avoided is those cases in which the patents are invalidated during the opposition
270. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The NAS proposal, which suggests that district courts could
also refer validity questions to an administrative “Open Review” process, would take us even further towards a
fully administrative determination of validity. See NAS PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 96. In addition to the FTC,
the NAS, and AIPLA, the academic commentary in favor of post-grant review has been overwhelming. See,
e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943,
967–68 (2004); Janis, supra note 63; Kesan & Gallo, supra note 247, at 76–95; Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy, supra note 4, at 1040; John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches
to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 731–37 (2002). Notably, Professor Mark
Lemley, perhaps the chief proponent of using litigation to address poor-quality patents, has recently endorsed
improved administrative procedures. See Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION,
Winter 2005–2006, at 10–12.
Currently, the primary impediment to enactment of post-grant review involves a dispute over whether
such review should be available throughout the life of the patent or only for a specified time period
after the patent is granted. Firms that rely heavily on patents and thus want early certainty about their
rights favor time limits on the availability of post-grant review. However, because some patents are
worth opposing only when they are actually asserted, such time limits would reduce considerably the
usefulness of an opposition process. Moreover, firms that require early certainty would be better served
by voluntarily opting into the system of rigorous review proposed in Part IV.B.2.
271. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 42, at 1002–07.
272. Some commentators have argued that post-grant oppositions might be less effective than
pre-grant oppositions to the extent that the PTO may be reluctant to question the validity of a patent that
it has already approved. See Kesan, supra note 244, at 778. As Kesan notes, however, this concern can
be addressed by clearly separating the post-grant review function from the examination function. See
Kesan & Gallo, supra note 247, at 111. As we noted earlier, the BPAI, which has a function clearly
separate from the examination process, has been quite aggressive in its review of patent denials by
examiners. See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
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proceeding. In a recent benefit-cost analysis, Bronwyn Hall and Dietmar Har-
hoff focus on this ability of post-grant proceedings to eliminate litigation over
dubious patents.273 In their analysis, they point out that if we assume a rela-
tively high revocation rate, and we further assume that revoked patents would
otherwise be litigated, the benefit-cost analysis weighs heavily in favor of
having post-grant review.274 Perhaps needless to say, however, much turns on
the cost of the review and the revocation rate. For example, assuming a
revocation rate of 35% (the rate of revocation under the European Opposition
Office process), a post-grant review cost of $100,000, and a trial cost of $2
million, the benefit-cost ratio is 7:1.275 On the other hand, if we assume a
revocation rate of 11% (the rate under the PTO’s existing patent re-examination
process) and a post-grant review cost of $500,000, the benefit-cost ratio is
unfavorable (0.44:1).276 Table 1 summarizes these calculations.
As indicated by the table, Professors Hall and Harhoff do not focus on
additional cost savings that might be generated by the avoidance of litigation on
patents that survive the examination process.277 But cost savings from such
patents may also prove important, particularly to the extent that the cost of
post-grant review is high, and the PTO revocation rate low (a plausible scenario
to the extent, for example, that opposed patents are generally solid but suffi-
ciently commercially valuable that they merit challenge). Thus, even if we
assumed a revocation rate of 11% and a post-grant review cost of $500,000, the
benefit-cost ratio might become favorable if in the other 89% of cases the
post-grant review would render a patent that otherwise would have been
challenged in litigation less likely to be challenged. If, for example, post-grant
273. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 42.
274. Id. at 1010–14.
275. Id. at 1012–13 tbl.3. Although we use the two million dollar figure cited by Hall and Harhoff
for purposes of consistency with their analysis, we note that the average figure for litigation that goes
through a full trial is higher. See supra note 269 (FTC report giving figures of five to seven million
dollars).
276. Hall & Harhoff, supra note 42, at 1012–13 tbl.3.
277. Indeed, for reasons that are unclear, they suggest that patents that survive the examination
process might, in certain scenarios, increase litigation costs. Id. at 1012–13. They do include, in several
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$500,000 .11 .89 $2,000,000 $220,000 $0 0.44:1
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review reduced by even 25% the chances of the patent being challenged, then
benefits from litigation avoided would increase to $665,000.278 With a low cost
of post-grant review, and relatively high revocation probability, benefits would
increase to $1,025,000.279 Table 2 summarizes these calculations.
Not surprisingly, then, many of the current proposals for post-grant review
attempt to obviate trial court litigation on patents that survive examination.
Generally speaking, these proposals use estoppel-based approaches. In other
words, if an opponent loses a particular issue of fact or law in the post-grant
review, it is estopped from raising the issue in subsequent litigation. For
example, patent reform legislation introduced in the House in 2005 specifically
provides that when the decision of a panel in an opposition proceeding becomes
final (and finality can be achieved whether or not the patentee chooses to
appeal),
the determination with respect to an issue of invalidity raised by an opposer
shall bar the opposer from asserting, in any subsequent proceeding . . . involv-
ing that opposer under this title, that any claim of that patent addressed in the
opposition proceeding is invalid on the basis of any issue of fact or law
actually decided by the panel and necessary to the determination of that
issue.280
The problem with estoppel is that it exacerbates the collective action problem
that already lurks in the post-grant review proceeding. In litigation, collective
action problems exist because the rules on non-mutual defensive issue preclu-
sion enunciated by the Supreme Court281 effectively cause the challenger who
successfully invalidates a patent to provide a public good. Under the issue
278. This result is reached by the following: $220,000 (.25)(.89)($2,000,000) $665,000.
279. $700,000 (.25)(.65)($2,000,000) $1,025,000.
280. Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9(f) (2005).
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preclusion doctrine, the challenger invalidates the patent not only for itself but
for the world at large. Thus, in the litigation context, patent challenges are likely
to be brought much less often than is socially optimal.282 As Professor Jay
Thomas has cogently argued, the inability of a patent challenger fully to
appropriate the benefits of an invalidity ruling creates the same disincentive to
bring an opposition challenge as it poses in the litigation context.283 Although
the lower cost of an opposition proceeding reduces the scale of the disincentive,
the disincentive is still there. Meanwhile, estoppel against an unsuccessful
challenger (which is also a feature of litigation under the Supreme Court’s
approach) significantly exacerbates the disincentive. Not only does the chal-
lenger provide a public good if it wins, but the challenger is uniquely disadvan-
taged if it loses—only the challenger is barred from raising again questions of
invalidity. In patent litigation, victory has a hundred fathers, but defeat is an
orphan. The addition of estoppel transfers all of the problems of litigation into
the administrative context.
Indeed, many patent lawyers argue that the estoppel provision in the existing
inter partes reexamination proceedings represents a major reason that such
proceedings have not been used.284 To be sure, current proposals for estoppel
emerging from post-grant review limit such estoppel to issues actually decided;
in contrast, the inter partes reexamination estoppel provision embraces all
issues that the reexamination requester raised or could have raised.285 Even so,
282. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 688–95 (2004) (discussing collective action problems raised by
Blonder-Tongue but also noting that the problem can sometimes be mitigated if the accused infringer
has blocking patents); see also Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved?
An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
237, 246 (2006) (comprehensive empirical study of cases brought in 1995, 1997, and 2000 that finds
there are “very few rulings of [patent] invalidity by the courts”). Joseph Farrell and Robert Merges
point out that the public good aspects of a patent challenge do not represent the only reason that such
challenges are likely to be brought less frequently than is socially optimal. As they note, in certain
situations involving oligopolistic competition between licensees that pay sales-based royalties to the
patentee, the potential for pass-through of such royalties may make the licensees’ combined loss from
paying royalties smaller than the patentee’s gain from the patent. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 270,
at 953–54. Administrative law cannot address the latter problem. However, while the public good
problem is likely to arise in most potential validity challenges, the pass-through problem may arise in
only a subset of such challenges.
283. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 333–34.
284. See, e.g., M. Patricia Thayer et al., Examining Reexamination: Not Yet an Antidote to Litiga-
tion, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 24 (2004) (noting that estoppel makes “inter partes reexamination
something of a double-or-nothing gamble”). Recently, there has been a slight rise in the use of inter
partes proceedings. Communication from Stephen B. Maebius to Arti K. Rai, April 11, 2006 (use of
such proceedings rose from 27 actions in 2004 to 59 in 2005) (on file with authors).
285. Section 315(c) of the Patent Act provides: “A third party requester whose request for an inter
partes reexamination results in [an order for such reexamination] is estopped from asserting at a later
time, in any civil action . . . the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on
any ground which the third-party requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes
reexamination proceedings.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Legislation currently pending
in the House would delete the “could have raised” language, thus bringing the inter partes reexamina-
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for reasons discussed above, an estoppel-focused approach is likely to restrict
the attractiveness of post-grant review proceedings.
A second problem with an estoppel-based approach is that, if the patent
survives post-grant review, estoppel obviates the need for only a limited amount
of litigation—litigation against the party who brought the opposition. Other
competitors are free to challenge the patent unhindered.286
The reform proposal by the National Academy of Sciences attempts to reduce
the impact of estoppel by proposing that it become operative only if appeal is
taken to the Federal Circuit.287 This proposal makes some sense: if the chal-
lenger that loses the opposition wants to avoid estoppel effects, it can simply
refrain from appealing to the Federal Circuit. Indeed, as a matter of doctrine,
estoppel is appropriate only after an appeal to the Federal Circuit: estoppel is a
rule of civil procedure and it should presumptively apply only to results that
emerge from actual litigation. But low-cost review without estoppel merely
reduces the scope of the collective action problem. The successful opposer still
provides a public good.
One mechanism for addressing the lingering collective action problem would
be through some type of reward or bounty system. For example, the current
system under which generics challenge pharmaceutical patents has an exclusiv-
ity reward (the successful generic challenger is allowed to market its generic
exclusively for a 180-day period).288 Recognizing the collective action problem,
Professor Thomas has proposed a bounty, charged against patent applicants, for
those who bring successful administrative oppositions.289 However, rewards
and bounties are subject to problems of collusion and are also notoriously
difficult to calibrate appropriately.290 The social cost that would have been
imposed by the invalidated patent is an obvious criterion to use in calculating
rewards. At the post-grant review stage, however, the patent might be early in
its life cycle. Thus while potential third-party opposers may be able to guess
that the patent has some commercial significance, the patent’s precise social
impact might be difficult to assess.291
tion language into conformity with the language on the proposed post-grant opposition proceeding. See
Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005).
286. It is possible that courts and/or juries might give some weight to the fact that the patent
survived an adversarial examination. But what weight they will give to this fact is unclear.
287. See NAS PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 101. In a somewhat similar vein, Joseph Farrell and Robert
Merges contend that an administrative opponent who loses should not be precluded from raising the
same arguments in litigation. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 270, at 967.
288. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
289. See Thomas, supra note 38, at 340–53. Thomas sets up his bounty system in the context of a
pre-grant opposition. It could readily be adapted, however, to post-grant oppositions.
290. For discussions of such problems, see id. at 345–47, 349–50.
291. Professor Miller emphasizes the valuation problem in arguing against the Thomas bounty and
in favor of a litigation-stage bounty calculated on the basis of the patentee’s past profits. Miller, supra
note 282, at 695–701. A bounty based on past profits does not, however, necessarily track well the
social cost of a bad patent. For example, such a bounty would not work against the much-discussed
problem of non-practicing patentees who assert patents for “hold-up” purposes. More generally, there
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In contrast with rewards or bounties, a one-way fee shifting proposal of the
type advanced by Professor Jay Kesan might provide a more administrable
mechanism for addressing collective action problems. Under Kesan’s proposal,
opponents who successfully invalidated a patent based on prior art that should
have been discovered by the patentee would recover their fees.292 Fee shifting
would address the collective action problem only in part, however, because fee
recovery would allow the successful opposer to recover only a small portion of
the public good it had provided.
b. Improving Post-Grant Review Through Deference. An option short of
bounties that might be used in addition to one-way fee shifting is strong judicial
deference. Such deference could reduce the intensity of the collective action
problem. Deference to the results of post-grant review would have to operate
with respect to both fact and law: although facts are particularly critical to
patent validity, deference on legal determinations would also be important
because patent validity has been deemed ultimately to be a question of law.293
Specifically, once the PTO had ruled a patent valid in a post-grant review, the
PTO’s factfinding on evidence it had considered would be subject to APA-level
deference, and the determination of patent validity as a whole (again, with
respect to the evidence considered) would be subject to Chevron deference.
Both deference on factfinding and Chevron deference would obviously apply
irrespective of the identity of the party against whom it was asserted. Such
deference would mean that unless the administrative opponent had pursued an
appeal to the Federal Circuit (and was therefore subject to estoppel), it would be
no worse off than any other potential infringer. Moreover, even if the administra-
tive opponent were uniquely subject to estoppel, other potential infringers
would also feel the negative effects of the deference. Ex ante, that would mean
that all potential infringers would have an incentive to help the administrative
opponent. After all, if the opponent lost, the consequences of such a loss would
be visited not only upon the opponent but also upon other potential infringers.
Such assistance could be provided through a variety of mechanisms. For
example, even without any additional change to the patent statute, competitors
might be able to use 35 U.S.C. § 301, which allows “[a]ny person at any time”
to submit to the PTO prior art patents and printed publications that the person
“believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular
patent.”294 Better yet, post-grant review could specifically provide mechanisms
are multiple problems, well-rehearsed by many commentators, with waiting until the litigation stage to
weed out bad patents. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
292. See Kesan, supra note 244, at 787, 795–97.
293. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (noting that the “ultimate question
of patent validity is one of law”). Deference with respect to legal questions would also mitigate any
tendency on the part of courts to turn fact into law in order to assert more aggressive review.
294. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). Under this section, if the person “explains in writing the pertinency
and manner of applying such prior art to at least one claim of the patent, the citation of such prior art
and the explanation thereof will become a part of the official file of the patent.” Id. Moreover, “at the
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for multiple challengers to oppose a patent.
A strongly deferential approach to review of patents that survive patent
examination would address collective action problems. It would also presum-
ably lead to diminished litigation over these patents. As we noted earlier, even a
25% percent reduction in likelihood of litigation would considerably improve
the efficiency gains that could be realized through post-grant review. Moreover,
to the extent that a trial-type administrative proceeding is likely to be more
accurate than a judicial proceeding, a strongly deferential approach would also
improve accuracy. Numerous commentators have noted the difficulties raised by
the reality that complicated technical factfinding must, under conventional
Seventh Amendment doctrine, be done by a lay jury.295 But the Seventh
Amendment does not bar a requirement of strong jury deference to an agency
determination of validity.
The intuition behind a deference-based approach—taking administrative pro-
cedure seriously and not treating it simply as a subset of procedures used in
litigation—is also found in the apparently successful European system of
post-grant review. Under the European system, post-grant review is explicitly
promoted as a major venue for challenging validity.296 Deference would simi-
larly make post-grant review the main avenue for challenging validity in the
United States.
The FTC report addresses the question of judicial review of post-grant
oppositions by recommending that Congress include in its legislation authoriz-
ing such oppositions a provision for Chevron deference to the results.297 But a
specific statutory provision regarding Chevron deference is not necessary:
ordinary principles of administrative law would provide Chevron deference
even if Congress were to omit any reference to a standard for judicial review.
The various post-grant review proceedings that have been proposed would be
trial-type procedures on the record that bear the hallmarks of formal adjudica-
tion—most notably, a proceeding before an administrative judge at which the
parties present evidence and cross-examination, with the judge’s decision based
written request of the person citing the prior art, his or her identity will be excluded from the patent file
and kept confidential.” Id.
295. See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical
and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1939 n.27 (2001) (collecting cases and articles
discussing difficulties of lay juries undertaking complicated technical factfinding); Wendy E. Wagner,
Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 827 n.197 (1997)
(same).
296. For example, if a party wants to challenge the validity of an EPO patent that subsequently
becomes the subject of an enforcement action in a German court, it must do so through a collateral
proceeding know as a nullity proceeding. See Jan J. Brinkhof, The Revocation of European Patents, 27
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 225, 231 (1996). In the Japanese system, which for a five-year
period had a dual system allowing validity questions to be raised in both post-grant review at the
Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and in the courts, the trial for invalidation was initiated at the JPO in
ninety percent of cases. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 247, at 120.
297. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 23–24.
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on the record.298 Such proceedings would have sufficient formality to satisfy
Mead’s test for application of Chevron deference.299 Thus, if Congress created
these procedures and said nothing more, Chevron deference would seem to
apply to them. Congress could of course avoid any confusion by specifically so
stating, but that would not be necessary.
Chevron deference is greater than the Skidmore deference that applies to
other PTO actions.300 Application of Chevron to post-grant review will thus
bring about a real change in the standards applicable to PTO legal determina-
tions. Such a change is normatively attractive for the reasons suggested in Part
III.B: a decisionmaking process like post-grant review would entail sufficient
rigor that we should have more confidence in it than we would other PTO
actions. That makes the very great deference of Chevron appropriate.
2. Selecting Into Rigorous Examination
As we have discussed, post-grant opposition is likely to target those patents
that are commercially valuable. In some cases, however, commercial value will
not be apparent until well after the patent issues. Thus, for post-grant opposition
to be effective, the ability to bring such an opposition should be available
throughout the life of the patent. Indeed, an optimal scheme might require
patents that are asserted in litigation to be referred to the PTO for a post-grant
determination of validity.
For those patentees who needed early certainty about their rights, Congress
could provide for the same rigorous review of patents at the examination stage,
rather than after the patent has been granted. That is, in addition to creating
post-grant review,301 Congress could create an option for a patent applicant to
have the initial consideration of its application undergo the same sort of
rigorous evaluation that post-grant review would entail.302 The formal adjudica-
tion envisioned as part of post-grant review would simply occur at the examina-
tion stage. And the deference accorded to formal adjudication discussed in the
previous section would apply here as well.303 As with post-grant review,
Congress would not need to create special deference rules but instead could rely
on ordinary principles of administrative law. Patent applicants would be able to
opt into this formal adjudication, knowing that it would be a more searching
review that would be subject to more deference as a matter of administrative
298. See supra notes 88, 151 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556, 557 (2000)).
299. See supra notes 134–39 (discussing Mead).
300. See supra notes 140–45 (discussing Skidmore).
301. Procedures for rigorous initial review would be in addition to procedures for post-grant review
because the rationale for post-grant review would still apply to patent applications that did not go
through this searching review at the initial stage.
302. Mandating rigorous review, rather than allowing applicants to choose it, would not be attrac-
tive. Our arguments would not support such a mandate, and it would not be cost-effective, given the
greater costs of formal adjudication.
303. See supra notes 293–300 and accompanying text.
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law.304 For those types of invention for which firms might need early certainty
about their patent rights (for example, drug inventions), this type of formal
adjudication might be particularly useful. In contrast, those inventions that had
not gone through formal adjudication ex ante would presumably be subject to
such adjudication ex post throughout the life of the patent.
There are two obvious differences between post-grant review and rigorous
examination ex ante. First, the former entails two steps (ordinary examination
and post-grant review), and the latter entails only one. Second, rigorous examina-
tion would be initiated by the applicant, whereas post-grant review would be
initiated by someone opposing the applicant. This second difference raises a
question as to whether the examination will always be rigorous. Congress
should allow opponents of a patent grant to participate in the rigorous examina-
tion—as they would participate in the post-grant review—and the threat of
deference should attract opponents in this context as well. It might be, however,
that some such examinations would not draw opponents—and that might raise
concerns about a lack of rigor.
The degree of rigor is, however, something that Congress can control in
creating the procedure. Congress could, for instance, place a greater evidentiary
burden on the applicant (for example, mandating not only disclosure of prior art
but also a statement of the relevance of the prior art)305 or mandate that the PTO
undertake a more extensive search for prior art if there was no opposition.
304. Beth Noveck has recently proposed what she calls “peer to patent” review, which would
attempt to foster greater rigor in the examination process by allowing applicants to “opt in” to open
public review; the PTO has announced plans to experiment with a form of such review (which it calls
“Patent Application Peer Review Pilot”). Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelli-
gence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2006); USPTO, STRATEGIC PLAN
2007–2012, at 18 (2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-
2012v6.doc. Jay Kesan has previously raised the option of selecting into more rigorous examination,
Kesan, supra note 244, at 770–75, as have Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman, and Bhaven Sampat. Lemley
et al., supra note 270, at 12. None of these articles nor the PTO plan frames their proposals in
administrative law terms, however. Relatedly, it is not clear whether these proposals contemplate the
level of rigor necessary for Chevron deference.
In a recent article draft, Doug Lichtman discusses more rigorous review and does briefly make one
argument related to administrative law: he suggests that the PTO might issue a regulation announcing
that its patent grants should not be entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Doug Lichtman,
Aligning Patent Presumptions with the Reality of Patent Review 14–15 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors). There is little reason to believe that courts would give such a statement much weight,
however, because the PTO’s regulations are not entitled to Chevron deference and because a key
consideration under Skidmore is consistency with prior agency interpretations. See supra text accompa-
nying note 140, notes 149–50 and accompanying text. Thus, even in the highly unlikely event that the
PTO reversed its previous claims that its grants are entitled to a strong presumption of validity and
instead “welcom[ed] the courts to revisit the question of patent validity,” Lichtman, supra, at 14, that
reversal would have little if any legal significance.
305. Jay Kesan has suggested a rigorous examination system in which patent applicants who
submitted a detailed disclosure indicating not only the prior art but also the relevance of each piece of
prior art that they had submitted would receive a specific presumption of validity; the court would not
invalidate the patent based on the disclosed prior art unless it was “convinced that no reasonable
examiner would have allowed the patent in light of the disclosed prior art.” Kesan, supra note 244, at
774.
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These might not be perfect substitutes for an opponent—just as there are
perceived benefits to having opposing litigants in the judicial context, there may
be benefits to having opponents in formal adjudications over patents—but we
do not need perfect substitutes. The idea is to have a grant procedure with
sufficient rigor to give us higher confidence in the outcome of the process, and
that seems achievable.
Moreover, insofar as there would be a fear that patent applicants would too
freely utilize this rigorous examination process—perhaps because they did not
fully bear its costs—Congress could very easily adjust those costs. The most
obvious mechanism would be to require that applicants reimburse the PTO for
the extra costs entailed in the more searching examination process.306
In any event, the appeal of this more rigorous examination process is that it
would offer significant potential benefits and require only a modest legislative
change—Congress’s creation of a formal adjudication procedure as an option
for patent applicants. As with post-grant review, and all other formal adjudica-
tions, Congress would not need to specify any particular levels of deference.
Ordinary principles of administrative law would provide for the same norma-
tively attractive levels of deference applicable to post-grant review, including
Chevron deference for legal conclusions and substantial evidence review of
factual findings.
C. ARE CHANGES TO THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW WORTH THE TROUBLE?
As we have seen, administrative law is centrally concerned with standards of
review—the exact formulation of words that govern the level of deference (or
lack thereof) that courts give to agencies. One might reasonably wonder whether
changes in the level of deference due administrative decisionmakers actually
have an effect on court decisionmaking and thus whether such changes are
worth the trouble. Some might argue that a court reluctant to relinquish power
would pay lip service to the relevant standard of deference but continue to
review cases in the same manner, either by simply failing to apply the relevant
standard or by arguing that the agency action falls into a category to which less
deference was owed.307 Additionally, a substantial empirical literature has found
evidence of ideological or “attitudinal” models of judging.308 This literature
might suggest that changes in deference standards will make little difference to
306. That said, it is not clear that there would be any reason for such a fear. Formal adjudication
imposes significant costs on applicants, akin to those for litigation (which it closely resembles).
307. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980–84
(1992) (arguing, based on analysis of Supreme Court decisionmaking immediately after the Chevron
decision, that Justices continued to apply the traditional (less deferential) pre-Chevron factors for
determining case outcomes); see also Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, supra note 4 (arguing that the
Federal Circuit has assumed an aggressive and formalist appellate role in part because of its concern
about the competence of inferior actors).
308. See, e.g., SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT
ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946–1992 (1995); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
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the extent that case outcomes ultimately depend on the ideological disposition
of judges (in this case the disposition of Federal Circuit judges towards pat-
ents).309 On this view, the Federal Circuit as a whole may be “pro-patent”;310
alternatively, individual judges may be either “pro-patent” or “anti-patent.”
Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko, we have some opportu-
nity to test the constraining effect of legal standards in the specific context of
the Federal Circuit. Cases like In re Lee, In re Beasley, and the Zurko case on
remand, discussed in Part I, represent clear examples of the Federal Circuit
straining to achieve aggressive review despite purportedly deferential standards.
In the Lee case, aggressive review was also achieved in part by attempting to
push facts into the category of policy.311 Similarly, on at least four occasions
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko, the Federal Circuit has
appeared to evade deference by recasting an appeal on a factual question into a
determination of claim construction (which according to the court is an issue of
law to be reviewed de novo).312
On the other hand, cases like In re Lee, or cases in which an issue of fact is
transformed into a question of claim construction, do not represent the entirety
of Federal Circuit decisionmaking. Post-Gartside, a fair number of Federal
Circuit affirmances of PTO factfinding have specifically referred to the impor-
tance of deference.313 In the context of the much-discussed issue of motivation
to combine or modify prior art references, the efforts of some Federal Circuit
panels to take deference seriously are particularly interesting. Some Federal
Circuit panels have agreed with the PTO’s determination that one or more of its
309. Cf. Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–27 (2006) (finding evidence that, even in cases
where Chevron is the relevant standard, political ideology (as measured by party of the appointing
President) strongly affects appellate court review of agency decisions by the EPA and NLRB); Orin S.
Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 35–40 (1998) (noting that Republican and Democratic judges reach
results consistent with their political ideologies in cases citing Chevron that have “relatively clear
ideological significance”); see also Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (examining 250 challenges to EPA action that were litigated in
the D.C. Circuit between 1970 and 1994 and arguing that ideology influenced decisionmaking).
310. See supra note 238 (empirical studies indicating that the Federal Circuit has been favorably
disposed towards finding patents valid).
311. 277 F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text
(discussing Lee). To buttress its case against use of examiner “common sense,” Lee cited in passing to
the State Farm line of “hard look” policy cases. 277 F.3d at 1344.
312. See, e.g., In re Simpson, 63 F. App’x 466, 472 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion); In re
Beigel, 7 F. App’x 959, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion); In re McNeil-PPC, Inc., 2000 WL
426148, at **1 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion); In re Baker-Hughes, Inc., 215 F.3d 1297,
1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
313. See, e.g., In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Berg, 320
F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Huston,
308 F.3d 1267, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Lam, 35 F. App’x 889, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (unpublished
opinion); Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
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cited references provided a motivation to combine.314 On occasion, these panels
have found this motivation in a reference that the PTO itself did not cite for that
purpose.315 In other cases, a panel has found the requisite motivation to
combine in the “nature of the problem to be solved.”316 In yet other cases, the
panel has ignored the “motivation” test entirely and simply indicated it will
defer to the PTO’s expert decision about what multiple references would teach a
person having ordinary skill in the art.317 The court has also stated that a written
reference is not necessary to satisfy the motivation to combine or modify test.318
To investigate the issue more comprehensively, we collected all appeals from
the PTO, decided in the five-year period immediately preceding the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zurko and the five-year period immediately following the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Gartside,319 in which the Federal Circuit explicitly
used language on fact-oriented standards of review (that is, the terms “clearly
erroneous” or “substantial evidence”).320 We then read these cases to identify
the subset that involved at least a Federal Circuit acknowledgment that it had
been called upon to review a factual question (as opposed to use of fact-oriented
review language as boilerplate). With respect to this subset, we coded as a
separate unit of analysis, or observation, the Federal Circuit’s resolution of each
challenged PTO finding on a claim or set of claims. Thus, for example, if a case
involved challenges to PTO factfinding in the areas of both written description
and nonobviousness, we coded each challenge (and resolution thereof) as a
separate observation. This coding sometimes involved difficult judgment calls
314. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 87 F. App’x 746, 749 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion); In re
Morant, 26 F. App’x 929, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion); In re Petrak, 10 F. App’x 831,
833 (2001) (unpublished opinion); In re Pfeiffer, 2000 WL 1648135 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished
opinion).
315. In re Huston, 308 F.3d at 1281.
316. In re Pfeiffer, 2000 WL 1648135, at *3.
317. In re Berg, 320 F.3d at 1315.
318. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Judge Newman, the author of the Lee case, and
Judge Lourie, the author of the Beasley case, lie firmly within the camp that wants to construe the
Supreme Court’s deference mandate as narrowly as possible. See In re Lee, 274 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (“Deferential judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act does not relieve the
agency of its obligation to develop an evidentiary basis for its findings.”); In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x
739, 744 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion) (same). Other judges, perhaps most notably Judges
Dyk and Bryson, appear inclined to give substantial deference. See In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x at 745
(Dyk., J., dissenting) (“I see no error in the Board’s reliance on the PTO’s own specialized knowl-
edge.”); In re Berg, 320 F.3d at 1315 (Bryson, J., majority) (emphasizing the “scientific competence” of
patent examiners and the BPAI in affirming a BPAI finding of obviousness).
319. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
320. To retrieve these cases, we searched both Westlaw and Lexis using two search algorithms. The
search algorithm—“clearly /2 erroneous,” “patent,” before “6/19/99” and after “6/19/94”—extracted
cases decided in the five-year period before the Supreme Court decision in Zurko. The search
algorithm—“substantial /2 evidence,” “patent,” after “2/15/2000” and before “2/15/2005”—extracted
cases decided in a five-year period after the Gartside decision. Of course, as we discuss further in the
text, our search would not retrieve those cases that did not explicitly specify use of either clearly
erroneous or substantial evidence review. David Almeling initially found and coded these cases. One of
us (Rai) also coded the cases. Almeling and Rai were able to agree on all discrepancies.
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with respect to whether the Federal Circuit was “really” reviewing a factual
issue—for example, as we noted earlier, in some cases the Federal Circuit turns
what began as an appeal of a factual issue into a question of claim construction.
In order to encompass situations where the Federal Circuit was endeavoring to
evade deference, we determined that if the Federal Circuit had at least initially
acknowledged the existence of a factual question, we should include it within
our analysis.
Upon completion of the sorting process, our pre-Zurko sample comprised
seventy-one observations, and our post-Gartside sample comprised seventy-
four observations. In the pre-Zurko sample, forty-nine of the seventy-one
observations, or 67%, represented affirmances. In the post-Gartside sample,
sixty-nine of eighty-five observations, or 81%, represented affirmances.
Because of our small sample size, this difference in affirmance percentages is
not statistically significant at the .05 level traditionally used in making predic-
tive claims based on a population.321 More generally, because of small sample
size; judgment calls associated with coding; the fact that our search would pull
up only cases in which the Federal Circuit acknowledged it had been called
upon to review facts; changes in judicial composition over the period of time we
collected cases; and the significant selection bias problems that accompany
analyses based on litigated cases (particularly analyses that cover long periods
of time, during which parties can adjust their behavior),322 we hesitate to draw
any strong quantitative conclusions. Nonetheless, our analysis does suggest that
at least in cases where the Federal Circuit acknowledges that it has been called
upon to review PTO factfinding, Dickinson v. Zurko has, on balance, had some
impact.
Our analysis is in accord with an early study by Peter Schuck and Donald
Elliott showing that the adoption of the Chevron standard produced a statisti-
cally significant change in judicial behavior.323 Schuck and Elliott conducted a
study of 1676 appellate cases produced by sixteen appellate courts that re-
viewed cases from fifty different agencies in six-month periods before and after
Chevron.324 They found that appellate courts affirmed agency decisionmaking
70.9% of the time in the pre-Chevron period and 81.3% of the time in the
321. Two separate tests of statistical significance failed to yield a P-value of .05 or less. Fisher’s
exact test yields a two-tailed P-value of .0931. A chi-square test yields a P-value of 0.1152 (chi-squared
equals 2.481, 1 degree of freedom).
322. In the specific context of empirical studies that assess the impact of changes in standards of
review, selection bias might result because, after a more lenient standard has been adopted, parties
choose to appeal only those agency decisions that involve particularly egregious lapses. Thus, a
reviewing court might be acting more deferentially but would nonetheless have the same affirmance
rate as before the change in standard. This is a particular problem with studies that require examination
over a relatively long period of time in order to create adequate sample size. Over this period of time,
parties can adjust their decisions to the change in standard of review.
323. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1029–32.
324. The Schuck and Elliott sample included all cases, not just cases in which the Chevron doctrine
was specifically invoked. See id. at 1032.
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post-Chevron period.325 Although the effect of Chevron diminished over time,326
such diminution would presumably be expected as parties adjusted to the more
deferential standard (and therefore challenged only agency actions that were
particularly problematic).
More recent work by a number of scholars indicates that judicial ideology
plays a significant role in Chevron-based appellate review of agencies by the
D.C. Circuit and by courts that address such politically charged areas as the
environment, immigration, and labor.327 The relevance of this work for the
Federal Circuit is unclear. As far as we are aware, no scholar has presented
evidence arguing that patents represent the type of politically charged area that
leads individual judges appointed by Presidents from different parties to view
patents differently. To the contrary, empirical work by John Allison and Mark
Lemley, involving appeals from district court cases, suggests that at least some
judges appointed by Republican administrations (Judges Mayer and Markey)
were quite likely to find patents invalid.328 The more pressing question is
whether the Federal Circuit as a whole is sufficiently “pro-patent” that changes
in deference standards will make little difference.329 Here our empirical study is
at least suggestive. Even a court that is arguably “pro-patent” appears to be
somewhat responsive to signals regarding deference from the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the costs of most of the changes discussed in this Article are
fairly low. Insofar as we are suggesting that the Federal Circuit adopt existing
standards from administrative law, the costs of such a move are not significant.
The standards are familiar terms of art that have been fleshed out in scores of
cases, so judges seeking to apply them can draw on a wealth of materials.
Indeed, these standards are better established than the ones that the Federal
Circuit has devised on its own. Perhaps most interesting is the reality that the
Federal Circuit actually applies these standards in its review of other agencies
325. Id. at 1030. This difference was significant at and above the 99% confidence level. Id. at 1032.
326. Id. at 1038; see also Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy
in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1071 (1995) (finding a more
dramatic diminution).
327. See Kerr, supra note 309, at 35–40 (finding that ideology matters in areas such as immigration);
Miles & Sunstein, supra note 309, at 823–25 (finding that ideology matters in appeals from the EPA
and the NLRB); see also Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (finding
that ideology influenced decisionmaking by the D.C. Circuit in cases that cited Chevron but that this
effect was tempered when a “whistleblower” from the opposite political party was on the panel).
328. John Allison & Mark Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 755 (2000). Our own data do suggest, however, that several judges appointed
by President Clinton (Judges Bryson and Dyk) are much more assiduous in their invocation of
deference than several judges (Judges Newman and Lourie) appointed by Republican presidents. This
observation supports the supposition that judges appointed by Democratic Presidents (“liberal” judges
in the conventional framework of attitudinal models) may be more deferential to administrative
expertise and regulatory judgment than “conservative” judges. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 309, at
838 (calling this supposition the “bureaucratic hypothesis”).
329. See supra note 238 (empirical studies finding that the Federal Circuit has been favorably
disposed towards finding patents valid).
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under its jurisdiction.
Recall, though, that in Part III.B we suggested that a normatively attractive
relationship might entail some very small changes in the level of deference that
the Federal Circuit accords to PTO decisions. The discussion immediately
above suggests why the costs of attempting to implement such finely calibrated
changes in standards of review are probably not worth the trouble. First, the
changes would be so slight that their impact (assuming full, good faith implemen-
tation) would likely be small. Second, they would move the standards of review
out of the existing terms of art. The idea would be to tweak the existing
categories just slightly, so that they apply a bit differently. But such a tweak
means that the many cases delineating the existing standards would not apply,
and instead the Federal Circuit would have to craft its own slightly modified
interpretations. In light of the small probable benefits (that is, the few case
outcomes that these small tweaks would be intended to change), the costs of
developing a modified jurisprudence for the new categories loom large and
probably outweigh the benefits.
Thus, at the end of the day, moving patent law to apply existing administra-
tive law categories, and then modestly changing PTO practices to change how
those categories actually apply to PTO actions, seems the best course of action.
The costs of such an approach are low and the benefits considerable. Even
without remaking patent law, we can use administrative law to push patent law
in a useful direction.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit, and many commentators, have long treated administra-
tive law as tangential (at best) to patent law. But the PTO is an administrative
agency, and the APA applies to the PTO and to the Federal Circuit’s review of
PTO decisions. Bringing the APA (and administrative law doctrine more gener-
ally) to bear on patent law regularizes patent law by applying established
standards of review. Thus the APA, and the voluminous case law interpreting it,
replaces ad hoc standards created by the Federal Circuit.
Application of administrative law principles also brings into focus possibili-
ties for making realistic and normatively attractive changes to PTO procedures
and to the Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO. It is tempting for academics, and
daunting for policymakers, to posit radical changes in existing law that would
create an ideal system. Such a recasting of patent law is not necessary, however,
for us to move patent law a considerable distance toward normatively attractive
standards of review. First-best solutions are (by definition) the most attractive,
but second-best solutions fare well if they are much more realistic and give us
much of what we want. The application of administrative law principles out-
lined in this Article presents such a second-best solution. So, while we wait
(indefinitely) for an ideal PTO and Federal Circuit to be created, principles of
administrative law offer real improvement based on a huge body of experience
in other areas of complex, technical regulation. To put the point more sharply,
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application of administrative law is the sort of “fully enabled” improvement that
the patent system is designed to foster.330
More broadly, examination of possible improvements to the patent system
highlights the downside of treating an area of law as sui generis, and thus not
subject to a general regime like administrative law. Not only is the specialized
area subject to capture by powerful interests, but it also fails to benefit from
well-established standards that could fairly straightforwardly be applied. Appli-
cation of a broad regime like administrative law allows us to recognize, and
build on, the commonalities between agencies. It also paves the way for more
scrutiny of patent law. A specialized legal regime creates obstacles for non-
specialists who want to understand and evaluate it; reducing that specialization
reduces those barriers. Application of administrative law removes some of the
mystique from patent law—but that is a feature, not a bug.
330. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring enablement for patent to issue). The “enablement” here
refers to the fact that the Federal Circuit appears to apply standard administrative principles when it
reviews agencies other than the PTO. See supra notes 161, 192 and accompanying text.
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